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Start-ups contribute to the creation of new jobs and are considered an essential driver of inno-
vation (Coad, Segarra, & Teruel, 2016; Haltiwanger, Jarmin, & Miranda, 2013; Lawless, 2014; 
Van Praag & Versloot, 2007). However, they often suffer from credit constraints due to a lack 
of sufficient collateral (Carpenter & Petersen, 2002b, 2002a; Cosh, Cumming, & Hughes, 2009; 
Da Rin, Nicodano, & Sembenelli, 2006). Venture capital (VC) funds bridge the funding gap 
with private equity (PE) investment. They support entrepreneurs in their start-up phase, aiming 
to exit after several years via a sale of the company or an initial public offering (IPO) 
(Schwienbacher, 2008). Restrictions on the transfer of tax losses after the exit of investors have 
been criticized as one deterrence for VC funding. In particular, this claim applies to companies 
carrying substantial amounts of start-up losses. In this paper, I investigate whether VC investors 
indeed reduce the financing of start-ups in response to anti-tax loss trafficking rules. 
For tax purposes, most countries treat losses asymmetrically. Profits are taxed immediately, 
whereas losses can only be deducted against past profits (loss carryback, LCB) or future profits 
(loss carryforward, LCF). Initially, most start-ups invest in their projects without generating 
corresponding income, resulting in an overall loss. Empirical evidence confirms that LCFs tend 
to be concentrated among young firms (Cooper & Knittel, 2006). These LCFs can only be set 
off at a later stage when the start-up turns profitable. As such, the tax assets are valuable because 
they can reduce future tax liabilities.  
In some instances, such as a substantial change in activity or ownership, anti-tax loss trafficking 
rules can lead to the forfeiture of accumulated LCFs. What constitutes a harmful change de-
pends on the country-specific regulations. Substantial changes in ownership are often defined 
as changes above 50% or changes in control. Changes in activity can be tied to financial state-
ment figures or target markets, or a general reference that provides a lot of flexibility in inter-
pretation. Legislators aim to counter so-deemed abusive transactions, where bankrupt corporate 
shells are bought. These corporations do not have noteworthy economic activity or prospects. 
Other profitable companies acquire them for no reason other than their LCFs. However, the 
regulations might also, unintentionally, affect transactions with sound economic reasons. 
Broadly speaking, investors might refrain from partaking in an investment or acquisition if they 
risk endangering valuable LCFs. More particular, the restrictions could affect start-ups that are 
only just beginning to build up their business (Bührle & Spengel, 2020). 
These tax loss provisions might prevent investors from funding a start-up’s undertakings if 
losses have accumulated over time that may become worthless due to the regulation (Haufler, 
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Norbäck, & Persson, 2014). When venture capitalists exit, the start-up can still carry substantial 
amounts of LCFs. The exiting investors will incorporate the value of the LCF in their price 
calculations. However, if buyers cannot use the losses after the acquisition, they will not be 
willing to pay for them, leading to a different valuation of the start-up (Sureth-Sloane & Vollert, 
2009). This could lead to lower prices and thus lower returns for the VC investor, up to the 
prevention of transactions that otherwise would have taken place.  
I analyze whether the forced forfeiture of LCFs impairs VC funding of start-ups by exploiting 
variation in the design of anti-tax loss trafficking rules within countries over time. Some of the 
EU28 Member States1 introduced new or relaxed existing restrictions over the last two decades. 
The regulations target abusive transactions, not VC funding of start-ups. It is unlikely that leg-
islators change them in response to developments in the VC market. Therefore, I do not view 
reverse causality as a problem. First, I conduct several case studies. I match companies in coun-
tries where restrictions were introduced or altered to companies in similar countries without a 
change in legislation. Second, I employ a combined analysis of several types of changes. For 
this purpose, I utilize a ranking of the different anti-abuse systems based on their strictness, as 
described in Bührle and Spengel (2020). I perform both analyses with an event study and a 
difference-in-differences (DiD) design. I employ firm and year fixed effects in addition to time-
varying country- and firm-level control variables.  
I base the empirical analysis on the VICO 4.0 database, a firm-level dataset of EU28 companies 
that received VC funding between 1999 and 2014. VICO 4.0 is a combination of data on Euro-
pean start-ups from several proprietary datasets. Researchers compiled the database under the 
European Commission’s “Research infrastructure for and innovation policy studies” (RISIS) 
project. So far, mainly finance and management researchers employed the data for research on 
the VC industry (e.g., Bertoni, Croce, & Guerini, 2015; Croce, D’Adda, & Ughetto, 2015; 
Croce, Martí, & Murtinu, 2013; Grilli & Murtinu, 2014; Guerini & Quas, 2016).  
My results indicate a significant and large negative effect of anti-tax loss trafficking restrictions 
on the VC funding volume provided to a company. Particularly my findings in Slovenia, where 
restrictive ownership-based regulations were introduced and later relaxed to a cumulative re-
gime, illustrate the effect of anti-tax loss trafficking rules: Stricter rules exert a stronger and 
more significant negative influence. Less restrictive regulations do not seem to impair VC fund-
ing. The estimates of the combined analysis are in line with the results of the case studies. I find 
a more substantial and significant impact on older companies aged between ten and 15 years. 
                                                          
1 EU28 refers to the European Union Member States at 2014, before the Brexit in 2020. 
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Therefore, the tax regulations might be more relevant at later investment stages. In line with 
my expectations, companies in high-tech sectors seem to be predominantly affected: High-tech 
start-ups, on average, receive more VC funding and carry higher losses, rendering the impair-
ment due to the restrictions more severe.  
My research is related to several strands of literature. First, I add to the literature on the deter-
minants of VC funding. In this context, evidence on the effect of taxes is rather scarce; research-
ers have considered taxation as one factor among many (Da Rin, Hellmann, & Puri, 2013; Jeng 
& Wells, 2000). Some studies specifically focus on corporate income (Da Rin, Di Giacomo, & 
Sembenelli, 2011) or capital gains taxes (Edwards & Todtenhaupt, 2020; Keuschnigg & Bo 
Nielsen, 2003; Keuschnigg & Nielsen, 2004). Da Rin, Nicodano, and Sembenelli (2006) con-
sider temporal LCB and LCF provisions in the context of  VC markets. Their results do not 
suggest that forfeiture of accumulated losses after a specified amount of time significantly de-
creases VC activity. While this could indicate that VC investors do not attach much importance 
to LCFs, this finding does not necessarily extend to the forfeiture of LCFs due to tax loss trans-
fer restrictions. Second, and more specifically, I shed light on the impact of anti-tax loss traf-
ficking rules. So far, the literature has focused on temporal loss restrictions for LCBs and LCFs. 
Empirical studies point towards adverse effects of temporal restrictions of tax loss assets: They 
increase effective tax rates (Cooper & Knittel, 2010), impair corporate investment decisions 
(Bethmann, Jacob, & Müller, 2018; Dreßler & Overesch, 2013; Niemann, 2004), and discour-
age entrepreneurial risk-taking (Haufler et al., 2014; Langenmayr & Lester, 2018; Ljungqvist, 
Zhang, & Zuo, 2017; Mehrmann & Sureth-Sloane, 2017). These impairments disproportionally 
hit small and newly established firms. Several authors discuss the reason for anti-loss traffick-
ing rules (Bührle & Spengel, 2020; Hoenig, 2014; Nijhawan, 2015; Poitevin, 2003). Moore and 
Pruitt (1987) find that the tightening of loss transfer restrictions in the US lead to a decrease in 
the market valuation of loss-reporting companies. Taken together, the empirical literature sug-
gests that loss provisions matter, and more so for young compared to mature companies. There 
is a growing literature on LCB and LCF regulations, but evidence on anti-loss trafficking rules 
and their impact on VC funding is still missing. 
Evidence on the effect of tax loss provisions on VC funding is relevant for policymakers. My 
results substantiate the ongoing debate about tax loss restrictions with empirical evidence. The 
findings support the notion that anti-tax loss rules (unintentionally) impair start-up financing. 
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Therefore, it is advisable for policymakers to factor in potential adverse effects on the VC en-
vironment when designing anti-abuse legislation.2 As the European market is still lacking be-
hind the American VC industry (Hege, Palomino, & Schwienbacher, 2009), it is vital to remove 
possible obstacles. Impairment of VC investment might harm a country’s competitive position 
(Carpenter & Petersen, 2002a). The effect of tax loss restrictions gains in relevance in the con-
text of the COVID-19 pandemic: Due to lockdowns, sales shortfalls, and generally unfavorable 
economic conditions, corporate losses are on the rise. Especially in times like these, supporting 
future-oriented companies could speed up the recovery of the economy. 
The paper is structured as follows: In section 2, I provide a brief introduction to the VC funding 
process and tax loss restrictions. Based on this theoretical foundation, I develop my hypotheses. 
I present the description and sources of the data utilized in the third section. Section 4 contains 
a selection of case studies. In section 5, I conduct the combined analysis, complemented by 
several heterogeneity analyses and robustness checks. I conclude in section 6. 
2. Setting and Hypothesis Development 
In this section, I first describe the process of VC funding (section 2.1), continued by an over-
view of the tax treatment of losses (section 2.2). In the last sub-section, I connect both aspects 
and pose my hypotheses (section 2.3). 
2.1 The Stages of Venture Capital Financing 
Start-ups often suffer from credit constraints. At some point, the private savings of the founder 
are insufficient to cover the start-up expenses; the company depends on external financing. 
Start-ups have difficulties satisfying their capital demand with bank loans or other traditional 
funding opportunities since they lack adequate collateral (Carpenter & Petersen, 2002b, 2002a; 
Cosh et al., 2009; Da Rin et al., 2006). VC investors target this type of firm and offer VC 
funding as a form of equity financing to young and risky companies. The investment is usually 
conducted long-term over several years, and includes additional advice and strategic support 
apart from the financing supplied. In the last quarter of 2019, VC-backed companies raised a 
total of $ 63.1 billion worldwide, thereof $ 34.2 billion in the US alone (54.2% of worldwide 
VC raised). With $ 7.9 billion (12.5% of worldwide VC raised) in the fourth quarter, the volume 
attributed to European companies is substantially lower (KPMG, 2020). The overall trend 
shows an ongoing increase in VC funding over the last years. Nevertheless, the European VC 
                                                          
2 Anecdotal evidence supports this concern, e.g. NVCA, https://nvca.org/pressreleases/nvca-cheers-prioritiza-
tion-startup-loss-carryforward-rule-reforms/ (05.11.2020), FAZ, https://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/un-
ternehmen/wie-helmut-jeggle-ueber-die-biontech-aktie-denkt-17007068.html (19.10.2020). 
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market still lacks behind compared to the environment start-ups face in the US (Hege et al., 
2009). Particularly European countries should therefore be aware of any obstacles to VC.  
VC investors participate in the up- as well as the downward risk of their protégés. Ideally, the 
investment yields a high return once the VC investors exit the company by selling their share 
in a trade sale or public offering. In the worst case, they lose the investment if the start-up fails. 
Therefore, evaluating potential investment opportunities weighs the associated risk against ex-
pected exit gains before the VC investors decide to get involved. The business plan, as well as 
the start-up founders and the management team, are assessed, followed by a thorough due dili-
gence review (Macmillan, Siegel, & Narasimha, 1985; Petty & Gruber, 2011). 
Figure 1: Five stages of venture capital financing 
Source: Own depictions, based on Madison Park Group’s “Guide to Venture Capital”. 
Five stages of start-up financing are commonly differentiated (Figure 1). Investors can provide 
VC financing at several of these stages. Over time, companies often conduct multiple funding 
rounds. Typically, the funding volume offered increases during the funding life cycle, as the 
start-up grows and can test the product idea in the market. VC investors will incorporate aspects 
of the current and subsequent stages into their decision-making process, taking into account 
• Newly formed company with limited track records, feasibility and market 
testing
• Potential investors: entrepreneur, friends and family
Stage 1: Start-up stage
• Business concept, product development
• Potential investors: angel investors (wealthy individuals that know the 
founder pesonally) and early stage VC funds
Stage 2: Seed or early stage
• Working business model
• Potential investors: VC investors
Stage 3: Growth stage
• Up-scaling of product, increase in market share
• Potential investors: VC investors
Stage 4: Late stage
• Profitable and stable company
• Potential investors: General public (exit of VC investors)
Stage 5: Buyouts and recapitalizations
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expected exit gains in the last stage. Research has not yet clearly determined whether taxes play 
a role in this decision process. 
2.2 Loss Carryforwards and Anti-tax Loss Trafficking Rules 
In their first stages, start-ups accumulate losses during product development until they enter the 
market and can generate sufficient revenue to break even. For tax purposes, the majority of the 
European countries treat losses asymmetrically.3 Profits are subject to taxation, whereas losses 
do not immediately result in a tax refund. Instead, they have to be set off against positive income 
in previous (LCB) or following periods (LCF). These tax loss assets carry value (assuming the 
company becomes profitable or used to generate profits in the past) as they embody potential 
tax savings. Research indicates that LCFs affect stock prices when loss-carrying firms are ac-
quired; evidence for a pricing-in by the participating firms is ambiguous (Chiang, 
Stammerjohan, & Englebrecht, 2014; Haw, Pastena, & Lilien, 1987; Hayn, 1989; Henning, 
Shaw, & Stock, 2000; Plummer & Robinson, 1990). However, LCFs are subject to temporal 
and relative restrictions. Studies show that these tax assets tend to be concentrated among young 
firms (Cooper & Knittel, 2006). Compared to mature firms, newly established companies face 
on average higher losses and lower loss utilization rates as well as higher expected tax rates. As 
a result, new firms and certain industries, such as the information sector, are disproportionally 
disadvantaged by asymmetric tax loss treatment (Cooper & Knittel, 2010). Similarly, Zwick 
(2021) shows that especially small companies eligible for loss offset do not claim their refund 
due to tax complexity. Overall, the temporal and relative loss limitations seem to hit start-ups 
in particular. 
In addition to temporal restrictions, anti-tax loss trafficking rules can lead to the forfeiture of 
accumulated tax LCFs. Absent tax loss transfer limitations, unprofitable corporations with high 
LCFs can be acquired and merged with profitable firms to set off the otherwise worthless losses. 
The restrictions aim to prevent loss trafficking; in other words, the acquisition of shell compa-
nies with significant LCFs but without any economic activity. Legislators deem these transac-
tions abusive as the sole purpose is the transfer of the tax assets. The restrictions apply to all 
corporations and do not target start-ups or VC-funded companies. However, the systems rely 
on general criteria to cover a broad spectrum of cases. Depending on the specific design, the 
limitations could also affect transactions with an economic justification, such as VC exits.  
                                                          
3 Exceptions are Estonia (already for decades) and Latvia (since 2018). In their tax systems, corporate tax is levied 
upon distributions only, thus rendering tax loss restrictions irrelevant. Also outside the EU, asymmetric treatment 
of profits and losses is the general rule (e.g. in large economies such as the United States, Canada or China). 
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In 2018, 21 of the EU28 Member States had anti-tax loss trafficking regulations, with various 
designs across countries (Bührle & Spengel, 2020).4 The provisions commonly refer to a sig-
nificant change in ownership and/ or a change in activity as triggering criteria. What constitutes 
such a significant change differs depending on the national legislation. In general, a change in 
ownership is considered harmful when the controlling majority of the corporation carrying the 
losses changes. The aim is to limit the benefits of LCFs to the shareholders that bore them. 
Changes in activity are often evaluated based on changes in assets, turnover, or targeted cus-
tomer markets. The legislator ties the use of losses to profits generated by the activity that 
caused them in the first place. Several papers discuss the rationale behind anti-loss trafficking 
rules (Bührle & Spengel, 2020; Hoenig, 2014; Nijhawan, 2015; Poitevin, 2003). Moore and 
Pruitt (1987) investigate the change in stock prices after the revision of anti-tax loss trafficking 
rules in the US in 1984. They find that the change in legislation lead to a reduction in the market 
value of loss-reporting companies, because the present value of their loss carryforwards de-
clined. I am not aware of any study empirically investigating the effect of those restrictions in 
the context of VC funding.  
2.3 Venture Capital Investors and the Expected Value of Loss Carryforwards 
Legislators implement tax loss transfer restrictions as anti-abuse legislation. They aim to pre-
vent tax-motivated acquisitions of shell companies with large LCFs but negligible economic 
activity. However, the regulations could distort the funding of young companies.5  
As previously outlined, the empirical literature points towards adverse impacts of temporal and 
relative tax loss deduction limitations, which disproportionally hit small and newly established 
firms (Cooper & Knittel, 2006, 2010; Zwick, 2021). Furthermore, disadvantageous loss provi-
sions discriminate against risky investments (Haufler et al., 2014; Langenmayr & Lester, 2018; 
Mehrmann & Sureth-Sloane, 2017). However, when it comes to a venture capitalist’s invest-
ment decision, it is unclear whether taxation generally plays a role. To the best of my knowledge, 
Da Rin et al. (2006) are the only authors that consider the impact of temporal tax loss restrictions 
on VC activity. They do not find significant effects. In contrast, I investigate anti-tax loss traf-
ficking regulations, in other words the forfeiture of LCFs not after a specified amount of time 
but due to a specified event (changes in activity or ownership). Nevertheless, the irrelevance of 
temporal loss restrictions for VC activity could indicate that taxes and loss regulations might 
                                                          
4 Bührle and Spengel (2020) provide a more detailed discussion of the design and development of the regulations. 
While my analysis focuses on Europe, tax loss transfer restrictions are applied throughout the world, such as e.g. 
the Section 382 limitation of the American IRC or Section 111 of the Canadian ITA. 
5  E.g. as mentioned by the National Venture Capital Association (NVCA): NVCA, https://nvca.org/pressre-
leases/nvca-cheers-prioritization-startup-loss-carryforward-rule-reforms/ (05.11.2020).  
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simply not matter to VC investors. Particularly in connection with high-tech start-ups, they 
might concentrate on other aspects such as the nurture of novel ideas and technological progress. 
However, while the forfeiture of LCFs due to time restrictions might not be considered in a VC 
context, this finding is not necessarily transferable to the denial of LCFs due to tax loss transfer 
restrictions. 
If taxes do matter, investors might be reluctant to fund a start-up’s R&D expenditure if accu-
mulated LCFs are worthless due to tax loss restrictions (Haufler et al., 2014). Restrictive tem-
poral and relative loss provisions aggravate the costs of bankruptcy as start-ups are, in contrast 
to diversified mature companies, unable to offset losses stemming from a failed project with 
profits from other projects (Henrekson & Sanandaji, 2011). Also, firms can potentially lose 
built-up LCFs after significant changes in ownership after an IPO or an acquisition by another 
company (events which depict the usual divestment strategies of VC investors (Schwienbacher, 
2008)). As a result, valuable LCFs are forfeited and thus not usable for succeeding investors. 
Sellers incorporate tax loss assets in their company valuation, as they still carry value before 
the divestment. At the same time, buyers exclude them, as they might be forfeited after the exit. 
This difference in valuation potentially leads to differences in asking and bidding price, de-
creasing prices, or preventing transactions altogether (Sureth-Sloane & Vollert, 2009). Overall, 
anti-tax loss trafficking rules can destroy significant value, raising the risk associated with VC 
funding. The risk increase could lead VC investors to reduce their investment or even to refrain 
from funding a start-up at all. 
However, anti-loss trafficking rules target so-deemed abusive tax-motivated acquisitions. Leg-
islators already provide escape clauses to avoid punishing economically justified transactions. 
These exemptions can release companies that are in the process of financial rehabilitation, pub-
licly quoted, part of a group, or carry hidden reserves. Some countries allow corporations to 
provide evidence of economic reasons for the transaction to refute the abuse assumption. De-
pending on the effectiveness of these escape clauses, loss provisions might not impact loss-
making start-ups the way they are supposed to affect bankrupt companies. Nevertheless, for 
start-ups, often only the provision of evidence is viable, if available.  
Overall, it is unclear whether anti-tax loss trafficking regulations impair VC funding. First, it is 
in dispute whether taxes matter at all for VC investment decisions. In response to the restrictions, 
investors could reduce their contribution. Given that they do, exemptions for start-ups might 
mitigate the impairment. I pose the following hypothesis: 
H1:  Anti-tax loss trafficking rules negatively affect the VC funding volume of a company. 
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The impact will likely differ depending on the specific regulation (Bührle & Spengel, 2020). 
Stricter rules will make it more likely that a company is affected by a change in its structure, 
whereas a more lenient regime will impose lower risks. Taking the exit strategy of investors 
into consideration, anti-tax loss trafficking rules relying on a change in ownership as triggering 
criteria pose the biggest threat. If venture capitalists buy substantial shares in a company and 
divest later, accumulated LCFs could be forfeited. Activity-based rules can, albeit less restric-
tive, still have potentially adverse effects if the start-up’s business strategy is changed to ac-
commodate altered conditions or to market the product better, and if these changes are deemed 
harmful by the tax authorities. Lastly, cumulative requirements, which require a change in ac-
tivity in addition to a change in ownership with a close temporal connection, pose the least 
distortionary restriction. If either one of the criteria is not fulfilled, in other words, if corpora-
tions are subject to either only a change in ownership or only a change in activity, LCFs are not 
affected. Based on this argumentation, I add the following hypothesis: 
H2:  The impairment in VC funding due to anti-tax loss trafficking rules depends on the spe-
cific type of change. Ownership-based regimes are more restrictive than activity-based 
regimes, and activity-based regimes are more restrictive than cumulative regimes.  
3. VC Funding in the EU28 
I conduct the empirical analysis of the hypotheses set up in the preceding section with data of 
VC-backed European start-ups taken from the VICO 4.0-database. Multiple researchers have 
compiled the database as part of the European Commission’s “Research Infrastructure for Sci-
ence and Innovation Policy Studies” initiative. It contains information on European companies 
that received at least one round of VC financing from 1998 to 2015. The database is a combi-
nation of different proprietary databases that have been matched to provide a more comprehen-
sive sample of VC-backed companies in the EU28. Additionally, financial statement infor-
mation has been obtained from BvD’s Orbis database. To the best of my knowledge, VICO 4.0 
is unique in its coverage and combination of data on the VC activity and features of European 
companies.6 The data has been used in several studies in other research areas (e.g., Bertoni, 
Croce, & Guerini, 2015; Croce, D’Adda, & Ughetto, 2015; Croce, Martí, & Murtinu, 2013; 
Grilli & Murtinu, 2014; Guerini & Quas, 2016). 
                                                          
6 For detailed information on the VICO 4.0 database, the construction of the final sample, and a discussion of 
potential sample selection bias, please refer to the appendix A2. The section also provides information on the 
geographical and temporal distribution of the observations. 
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For the empirical analyses conducted in this study, I remove 2015 from my sample because a 
large drop in observations indicates incomplete data in the last year. The initial sample consists 
of 140,534 observations of 11,665 distinct companies, of which 14,650 company-year obser-
vations report non-zero values of VC funding. Figure 2 depicts the mean and median per firm 
(left y-axis) and sum across all firms (right y-axis) of VC funding received by companies in the 
sample. An apparent spike in 2000 and a subsequent drop in 2001 marks the burst of the Dot-
com-bubble in that period. The financial crisis also resulted in a decline after 2008. While the 
overall sum of VC funding in the last decade is far from pre-Dotcom-levels, it started to increase 
again. Across all periods, the median lies below the mean, indicating that the data is skewed to 
the left. Several companies that received large sums of VC funding lead to a comparatively high 
mean, while more than half of the companies that raised funding received considerably lower 
amounts. 
Figure 2: Development of VC funding in the EU28 
 
Notes: Left y-axis: VC funding mean and median per firm in the sample. Right y-axis: VC funding sum across all 
firms in the sample. Winsorized at 1% and 99% level, excluding observations with zero VC funding. Coverage: 
1998 to 2014, EU28 Member States. Source: Own depiction based on VICO 4.0. 
4. Country Case Studies 
I first focus on individual changes. In the following sub-sections, I explore the anti-tax loss 
trafficking regulations in three selected countries: The introduction of an ownership-based and 
subsequent switch to a cumulative regime in Slovenia (4.2), the introduction of a cumulative 
regulation in the Czech Republic (4.3), and the change from a cumulative to an ownership-
based restriction in Germany (4.4). Compared to other European anti-tax loss trafficking rules, 
these three regimes were particularly restrictive. Both Slovenia and Germany implemented 
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ownership-based regimes. The Czech Republic employed more lenient cumulative restrictions. 
However, the low threshold for the application of the rules increased the risk of loss forfeiture 
compared to other regimes that only applied after larger changes in ownership. From the 
changes in legislation observed in my sample period, these three cases entailed the largest risk 
increase for investors. The appendix A4 entails additional case studies for less restrictive re-
gimes.7 
4.1 Identification Strategy  
In each case study, I estimate the effect of the specific change in legislation based on a DiD 
design. I compare how much VC funding affected companies receive after compared to before 
the treatment. To rule out confounding events affecting VC investment, I construct a compara-
ble control group that was not subject to a change in legislation. The common trend assumption 
requires treatment and control groups to behave similarly before the change in anti-tax loss 
trafficking regulations. 
Within a country, all companies are subject to anti-tax loss trafficking rules and, therefore, 
considered treated. Consequently, the control group has to consist of companies from other 
countries. To construct a comparable sample, I restrict the selection of countries that I consider: 
First, I exclude countries with changes in legislation within a four-year window before and after 
the event in the treatment country. Second, I limit the choice set to control countries similar to 
the treatment country in GDP and CIT level. In the next step, I match treated companies with 
non-treated companies chosen from the constrained control country set. I match on the age and 
total amount of assets of a company in the three years preceding the treatment.8 As a matching 
approach, I employ coarsened exact matching (CEM). With CEM, similar values of the match-
ing parameters are grouped; in other words, coarsened. Each group is then assigned a numerical 
value. Treated and control companies are exactly matched based on these parameter groups 
instead of the individual parameter value (Iacus, King, & Porro, 2011, 2012).9 I match with 
replacement and exclude companies without a match.  
For each case study, I employ an event study and a DiD approach for the matched sample. The 
event study results depict estimates at different points in time and establishes the common trend 
                                                          
7 The additional case studies are provided for sake of completeness. Including all case studies in the main part of 
the paper would increase the length excessively.  
8 I match on pre-treatment covariates instead of outcome variables, as the latter could increase bias (Chabé-Ferret, 
2017). In my regressions, the coefficients for age and firm size are a statistically significant predictor of VC 
funding volume. 
9 CEM also defines missing values as a group. In my setting, this poses an advantage compared to e.g. propensity 
score matching, which requires full information on all chosen matching parameters. In my sample, accounting 
information is unavailable for around 74% of the company-year observations. Requiring non-missing values for 
assets over a period of three years would pose a binding restriction and introduce severe sample selection bias. 
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assumption. The DiD analysis estimates the overall effect across all years following the change 
in legislation. 
I set the main focus on anti-tax loss trafficking rules as explanatory variables. I take information 
on tax loss provisions in the EU28 Member States from Bührle and Spengel (2020).10 As elab-
orated on above, tax loss transfer restrictions rely on one or a combination of two different 
criteria: Changes in ownership and changes in the activity of the company. I provided more 
detailed information on the country-specific design in the respective country case studies.  
Anti-tax loss trafficking rules are generally aimed at so-deemed abusive transactions and do not 
target VC divestments. Legislators usually implement changes out of tax avoidance concerns 
in the context of mergers of long-established corporations or in response to court decisions. 
Therefore, I do not expect reverse causality to pose a threat in my setting. 
First, I follow the standard event study design as explained in Schmidheiny and Siegloch (2019). 
The regression equation for the event study reads as follows: 
log(𝑉𝐶 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑓,𝑐,𝑡)






+ 𝛿 𝐶 + 𝐹𝐸𝑓
+ 𝐹𝐸𝑡 + 𝑓,𝑐,𝑡 
(1) 
The treatment dummy 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑐,𝑡
𝑗
 equals one at the time of change in legislation in the treatment 
country and zero otherwise. I include four leads and four lags, respectively. I bin treatment 
indicators at the ends of the event window in t-4 and t+4.11 I follow the standard and standardize 
the coefficient in the period preceding the treatment, 𝛾𝑛=𝑡−1, to zero. As a result, the other co-
efficients are expressed as changes in VC funding compared to the basis in t-1.  
Second, I estimate the overall effect in a DiD analysis:  
log(𝑉𝐶 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑓,𝑐,𝑡)
= 𝛼0 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑐 𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑡  + 𝛿 𝐶 + 𝐹𝐸𝑓 + 𝐹𝐸𝑡 + 𝑓,𝑐,𝑡 
(2) 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑐 is a dummy equal to one for the treated country and zero otherwise. 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑡 
equals one for the year of the change in legislation and subsequent years, and zero otherwise. 
                                                          
10 Bührle and Spengel (2020) compile their data from the IBFD Country Analyses and a number of tax guides 
(PwC, EY, KPMG). Additionally, assisted by a translation program, they verify and supplement the collected 
information with references to national tax law. 
11Binning the endpoints accounts for the limited effect window. It assumes that the effect stays constant before 
and after the period explicitly modeled. Thus, the estimate for t = 4 can be interpreted as a long-term effect. 
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The coefficient  for the interaction of both dummies represents the effect of the change in 
legislation on VC funding for the treated companies.  
I employ the same dependent and the same set of control variables in both the event study and 
the DiD analysis. For the dependent variable, the logarithm of the VC funding volume 
𝑉𝐶 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑓,𝑐,𝑡,
12 I consider the VC funding that a company f in country c received in year t. 
I derive the variable by summing up the equity raised by the company stemming from all fund-
ing rounds within one year.  
In some countries, escape clauses allow for exemptions from the restriction in some instances. 
I account for these clauses with a dummy variable. If legislators exempt firms from tax loss 
transfer restrictions based on rehabilitation, quoted companies, group affiliation, hidden re-
serves, or evidence of economic justification, I set Escape clause to 1. As most of the exemp-
tions are not viable for start-ups, I only expect a small positive effect, if any.  
In addition to the main independent variables of interest, I employ different country-level con-
trols, pooled in the vector 𝐶. I include the statutory corporate tax rate (CIT) 13 as well as the 
change in tax rates compared to the previous year ( CIT). Higher tax rates decrease the after-
tax return for corporate VC investors. Also, the value of LCFs is contingent on the applicable 
tax rate at the time of the loss offset.14 On the one hand, deducting LCFs in a high-tax country 
yields higher tax savings than offsetting an equal amount of LCFs in a low-tax country. On the 
other hand, a higher value of LCFs entails a greater loss in value if firms cannot use these tax 
assets. Furthermore, studies indicate that capital gains taxes at the investor level also influence 
VC investment (Edwards & Todtenhaupt, 2020). Thus, I include statutory capital gains (CGT) 
and dividend tax rates (DT). To account for temporal loss restrictions, all specifications include 
the number of years for which losses can be carried back (zero if not available) and forward.15 
I consider relative loss restrictions, in other words, size limitations, with LCF limit. The dummy 
is set to 1 if relative restrictions apply and zero otherwise.  
I rely on variables generally employed in the literature and control for a country’s economic 
environment by utilizing its GDP per capita and growth (Bernoth & Colavecchio, 2014; Cherif 
& Gazdar, 2011; Félix, Pires, & Gulamhussen, 2013; Li & Zahra, 2012). The set of controls 
                                                          
12E.g. Edwards and Todtenhaupt (2020) also employ the natural logarithm for their dependent variable, the amount 
of equity raised by a start-up. 
13 LCFs are deducted from the company’s taxable income. Tax base effects such as e.g. depreciation, are not rele-
vant in this case. Therefore, I do not use effective tax rates which include these effects. 
14 The relevant tax rate to be considered is the tax rate of the residence country of the company that incurred the 
losses. For non-group companies, cross-border loss offset is generally not allowed based on current tax law. 
15In case of an unlimited carryforward, following Langenmayr and Lester (2018), I set the variable to 20. 
15 
also encompasses inflation, measured by changes in the consumer price index (Bernoth & 
Colavecchio, 2014; Langenmayr & Lester, 2018). To account for the local labor market, I uti-
lize the unemployment rate (Bernoth & Colavecchio, 2014; Cherif & Gazdar, 2011; Félix et al., 
2013; Lüken, 2014). 
Government-funded investments influence the VC environment. Public VC investment should 
(in contrast to private VC investment) not react to local tax regulations. An increase in public 
funding increases the overall VC funding volume available in a country. One of the major play-
ers in the European VC market is the European Investment Fund (EIF). By working with local 
VC funds as intermediaries, they distribute equity financing and guarantees provided by insti-
tutions such as the European Commission or regional authorities. I include the amount of sup-
port (EIF amount) and the number of supported companies (EIF number) per country per year. 
I additionally account for public investment with the lagged amount of government-funded PE 
investment (Lagged Public PE). Table 11 in the appendix gives an overview of all variables 
and their sources. 
Finally, I include firm- and year fixed effects. Instead of employing time-varying firm-level 
controls in the case studies, I rely on matching as elaborated on above. Firm-level accounting 
information is available for less than a fourth of the observations; additional firm-level controls 
would therefore greatly limit the sample size.16  
4.2 Slovenia 
Slovenia first introduced an ownership-based loss transfer restriction in 2005, denying the off-
set of loss carryforwards after a change in ownership above 25%. In 2007, the threshold was 
increased to 50%, and an activity clause was added. Furthermore, an exemption was included 
for rehabilitation measures.  
Figure 3 illustrates the effect of the legislation changes, where the first event at t=0 depicts the 
first change in 2005 and the second event at t=2 represents the second change in 2007.17 There 
are no apparent differences between treated and control companies before the introduction of 
the ownership-based regime. The results indicate that VC funding dropped significantly in re-
sponse to the restrictions. Two years later, when the regulation was relaxed by introducing the 
cumulative requirement, the coefficient estimate turns positive. This change in VC funding 
                                                          
16 Depending on the national regulations, SMEs are not required to publish financial statements up to a certain size 
threshold, or do so in a shortened version. More than half of the companies report losses which presumably result 
in LCFs. 
17In deviation from the regression equation stated in formula (1) and (2), in the case of Slovenia government-
funded PE is not included as a control. The data provided by InvestEurope does not include Slovenia until 2007. 
However, the controls for funding programs from the EIF are available. 
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aligns with both my hypotheses: VC funding decreased in response to the introduction of re-
strictions. When the anti-tax loss trafficking rules were relaxed, the impairment vanished. Un-
surprisingly, the overall effect is not statistically different from zero. 
Figure 3: Results case study, Slovenia 
 
Notes: Events: Slovenia, introduction ownership-based regime in 2005 and change to cumulative regime in 2007. 
Dependent variable: Firm-level VC funding volume. Main graph: Results of the event study, difference between 
treatment and control group. Time dummies: “0”: time of change in legislation. “-t”: leads. “t”: lags. 95% confi-
dence intervals. Grey box: Results of the panel analysis; standard error in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level. Sample composition, descriptive statistics, event study results, and panel 
regression results: Table 13 to Table 16 (appendix). 
4.3 Czech Republic 
In 2004, the Czech legislators newly introduced tax loss transfer restrictions after substantial 
ownership and activity changes. The change in ownership was deemed substantial if one or a 
group of related persons gained more than 25% of a company's shares (e.g., due to acquisition 
or capital increase of existing shareholders). In such a case, the company could offset existing 
loss carryforwards only against future profits generated by business activities similar to those 
that lead to the losses.18 The law did not provide any explicit exemptions from the restriction. 
Figure 4 depicts the results of the event study. There are no significant differences between the 
treatment and control groups preceding the change in legislation. After introducing the cumu-
lative regime, Czech companies seem to receive less VC funding than their counterfactual peers 
in other countries. The effect is statistically significant in most of the periods post-treatment. 
The difference-in-difference analysis in the panel also results in a negative, albeit insignificant 
effect of the tax loss transfer restriction. Overall, the results suggest that the cumulative regime's 
                                                          
18An income structure test required that at least 80% of the income was generated from the same activities.  
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introduction negatively affected VC funding. The effect remains negative and statistically sig-
nificant at the 10% level from the fourth year after the change onwards. 
Figure 4: Results case study, Czech Republic 
 
Notes: Event: Czech Republic, introduction cumulative regime in 2004. Dependent variable: Firm-level VC fund-
ing volume. Main graph: Results of the event study, difference between treatment and control group. Time dum-
mies: “0”: time of change in legislation. “-t”: leads. “t”: lags. 95% confidence intervals. Grey box: Results of the 
panel analysis; standard error in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level. Sample 
composition, descriptive statistics, event study results, and panel regression results: Table 13 to Table 16 (appen-
dix). 
4.4 Germany 
The German tax law already restricted loss carryforwards after a cumulative change in owner-
ship and activity since introducing the anti-abuse legislation in 1991. In 2008, the rules changed 
substantially. Previously, loss carryforwards were denied after a change in ownership exceeding 
50% and discontinuing the original business.19 The German legislator cut the activity clause, 
resulting in a full extinction of loss carryforwards after a change in ownership above 50%. 
Furthermore, a pro-rata denial was introduced for changes between 25% and 50%. The regula-
tions applied equally to an individual or a group of buyers and newly acquired shares or in-
creases in existing shareholders' capital. Compared to other anti-tax loss trafficking rules pre-
sent in the EU, the German scheme was particularly restrictive.20 Exemptions for rehabilitation, 
hidden reserves and corporate groups were not introduced until later years.  
                                                          
19This was also the case if the business was continued with predominantly new business assets. A rehabilitation 
clause applied if the company was active for at least 5 years after the change in ownership. 
20The rules were criticized as “loss destruction provision”. After ongoing criticism, an activity clause was added 
in 2016. In 2017, a court ruling even deemed the pro-rate forfeiture unconstitutional. 
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The event study shows a clear negative trend in VC funding after changing the legislation (Fig-
ure 5). German companies received substantially lower VC funding volumes after implement-
ing the ownership-based regime. The effect is statistically significant at the 5%-level two years 
after the change in legislation and in the long run from the fourth year onwards. The differences 
between treated and control companies are statistically insignificant before the event, providing 
reassurance that both groups are comparable and behave similarly. However, the estimate is 
overstated (understated) if the control group companies were less (more) severely affected by 
the financial crisis that also hit in 2008. Considering that German companies emerged stronger 
from the crisis as compared to firms in other European countries, a bias of the results towards 
zero is more likely. Taken at face value, the panel estimate suggests an average decrease in VC 
funding of around -40%. 
Figure 5: Results case study, Germany 
 
Notes: Event: Germany, change from cumulative to ownership-based regime in 2008. Dependent variable: Firm-
level VC funding volume. Main graph: Results of the event study, difference between treatment and control group. 
Time dummies: “0”: time of change in legislation. “-t”: leads. “t”: lags. 95% confidence intervals. Grey box: 
Results of the panel analysis; standard error in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 
1% level. Sample composition, descriptive statistics, event study results, and panel regression results: Table 13 to 
Table 16 (appendix). 
4.5 Interim Findings 
The case studies presented in the previous sub-section and appendix A4 provide initial evidence 
for my first hypothesis: Strict anti-tax loss trafficking rules seem to impair VC funding. 
In line with my second hypothesis, the severity of the impairment differs depending on the 
regime type. The ownership-based regimes in Germany and Slovenia are more restrictive than 
other regulations in place in the EU. First, the limitation to the ownership criterion leads to the 
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forfeiture of loss carryforwards, even if the company itself and its business do not change. Sec-
ond, the thresholds applied were relatively low. The minimum trigger of 25% is far below the 
commonly defined threshold of a change of controlling interest of 50%. In that sense, the Czech 
regime is also comparatively restrictive, albeit it provided an additional activity clause. The 
results reflect these constraints. While VC funding decreased after the change in legislation in 
all three cases, I can only establish a long-run effect for the German regime. For the introduction 
of less restrictive cumulative regulations, such as in Lithuania in 2002 and Hungary in 2012 
(see appendix A4), I do not find any significant effect.  
5. Combined Analysis 
This section entails the combined analysis, where I consider changes in different countries sim-
ultaneously to derive more general results. For this purpose, I construct a categorical variable 
for the different types of anti-tax loss trafficking rules (section 5.1). Instead of matching the 
observations, I extend the empirical specification with firm-level control variables. This ap-
proach leads to a substantial decrease in sample size (section 5.2). I supplement the panel anal-
ysis (section 5.3) by heterogeneity analyses (section 5.4) and robustness checks (section 5.5)  
5.1 Categorization of Tax Loss Transfer Limitations 
So far, I have investigated individual events on a case-by-case basis. To conduct a combined 
analysis of all legislation changes in my sample, I divide the tax loss transfer restrictions into 
five categories based on their strictness (Table 1).  
Table 1: Categories of anti-loss trafficking rules  
Category Description 
Category 0 No explicit anti-loss trafficking rule 
Category 1 Denial of loss transfer after a change in ownership and activ-
ity (cumulative requirement) 
Category 2 Denial of loss transfer after a change in activity 
Category 3 Denial of loss transfer after a change in ownership 
Category 4 Denial of loss transfer after a change in ownership or activity 
(fulfillment of one criteria sufficient) 
Notes: Categories of anti-tax loss trafficking restrictions, ranked based on their strictness. Source: Bührle and 
Spengel (2020). 
For specific regulations (Categories 1 to 4), abuse is blanketly assumed based on codified cri-
teria. The burden of proof of the opposite rests upon the taxpayer. In those cases, the cumulative 
requirement of a change in activity and ownership is the least restrictive measure (Category 1). 
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As a firm has to fulfill both criteria, the forfeiture of LCFs can be avoided if the start-up main-
tains (and adequately documents) its business activity for the required periods, even if a new 
investor enters or existing investors increase their stake in the enterprise. If there is either only 
a change in ownership or only a change in activity, this type of restriction is not triggered. 
The forfeiture of losses after a change in activity imposes a more severe restriction on start-ups 
(Category 2). Especially in the initial stages, when the business plan is developed, or at later 
stages, when an existing business strategy is adjusted, substantial changes might lead to a shift 
of the company’s focus. However, given no changes in activity, new VC investors can partici-
pate and provide funding without triggering the anti-abuse regulation.  
Anti-abuse regulations that solely rely on a change in ownership fall in a more restrictive cate-
gory (Category 3). Within this category, any substantial VC divestment could pose a threat to 
accumulated LCFs within a start-up.  
Category 4 finally includes countries that relate to either a change in ownership or a change in 
activity, where the fulfillment of either criterion is sufficient. This poses the most restrictive 
rule, as it includes all cases that would be covered by either Category 2 or 3.21 
Figure 6: Comparison of loss transfer categories in the EU28, 2000 to 2014  
Notes: Number of countries applying anti-tax loss trafficking rules in a given year. Categories as defined in Ta-
ble 1. Source: Table 12 in the appendix and Bührle and Spengel (2020).  
Figure 6 compares the number of anti-tax loss trafficking rules in the EU28, differentiated by 
restriction category, from the first to the last year in the sample, 1999 to 2014. The categories 
vary across countries and time. The empirical strategy implemented in the following sections 
exploits the temporal variation. Over the years, more restrictive legislation was implemented.  
                                                          
21A more detailed overview and description of the anti-tax loss transfer regulations is provided in Bührle and 
Spengel (2020). For the purpose of the following analyses, retro-actively applicable rules are disregarded. At the 
time of funding, the information on the change in legislation was not yet available and could therefore not have 
affected the investment decision. As a result, the coding of transfer restriction categories displayed in the appen-




























Throughout the sample period, I identify a total of eleven changes in legislation. The cumulative 
regimes' overall number has not changed as two countries tightened their restrictions (Germany 
and Greece) while two countries relaxed their rules (Hungary and the Netherlands). However, 
data restrictions only allow me to analyze five of these changes in the following, namely in the 
Czech Republic (2004), Germany (2008), Croatia (2010), Hungary (2012), and Greece (2014). 
5.2 Descriptive Statistics and Identification Strategy 
I cannot employ the matching approach previously utilized in a panel setting with treatments at 
different times in different countries. The matched case studies sample each consist of selected 
companies that are weighted to achieve the greatest degree of comparability between the case-
specific treatment and control group. Neither combining the weighted observations from the 
individual case studies nor employing CEM on the full panel is viable to construct a regression 
sample. First, several of the companies in unaffected countries serve as a control for more than 
one change in legislation, possibly with a different weight.22 Second, companies that are af-
fected at one point in time might serve as control companies in other periods. 23 Therefore, I 
homogenize the sample by including the set of treatment and control companies that have been 
matched in the case studies, but without employing a weighting. Instead, I include several firm-
level controls to account for time-varying firm characteristics.  
Analogously to the case studies, I use two approaches: An event study design and a DiD anal-
ysis. Firstly, I conduct a generalized event study following Schmidheiny and Siegloch (2019). 
This approach allows the analysis of multiple and repeated events of different treatment inten-
sities. I note the regression equation as follows:  
log(𝑉𝐶 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑓,𝑐,𝑡)










+ 𝛾 𝐶 + 𝛿 𝐹 + 𝐹𝐸𝑓 + 𝐹𝐸𝑡 + 𝑓,𝑐,𝑡 
(3) 
In this specification, the treatment intensity 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑐,𝑡
𝑗
 is the primary variable of interest. I 
define the treatment as a change in the restriction category in a country in a year. I derive the 
treatment intensity by calculating the number of categories the restriction scheme dropped (if 
                                                          
22Each company needs to be appointed a fixed weighting parameter. If one were to simply use the weighting 
matrices constructed in the individual case studies and combine them, a control company could have multiple 
weighting parameters, originating e.g. because it was matched to Hungarian as well as to Czech companies. 
23I am not aware of any matching approach that would allow for the simultaneous matching of companies in the 
given setting. 
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regulations were relaxed) or climbed (if rules were tightened).24 I include the treatment at the 
event time and with four leads and lags, respectively. I bin treatment intensity at the ends of the 
event window in t-4 and t+4.25 I again standardize the coefficient in the period preceding the 
treatment, 𝛽𝑡−1, to zero. Consequently, the remaining coefficients have to be interpreted as 
changes in VC funding compared to the basis in t-1. 
The estimates of the event study confirm that treatment and control groups displayed common 
trends before treatment and yield average treatment effects at specific points in time. It is pos-
sible to pinpoint the impact of tax loss restrictions at the year of implementation or investigate 
potential anticipatory effects before the legislation changes. Second, to calculate average treat-
ment effects across the whole time horizon, I employ a generalized DiD approach:  
log(𝑉𝐶 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑓,𝑐,𝑡)
= 𝛼 + 𝛽 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛾 𝐶 +  𝛿 𝐹 + 𝐹𝐸𝑓 + 𝐹𝐸𝑡
+ 𝑓,𝑐,𝑡 
(4) 
The categorical variable 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦 ranges from zero to four, representing the dif-
ferent categories of anti-loss trafficking restrictions. Zero represents the least and four the most 
restrictive rule (as discussed in section 5.1).26 With this approach, I include the full set of coun-
tries and regulations. 
I employ the same dependent variable, country-level controls and fixed effects as in the case 
studies (4.1). In addition, the vector 𝐹 entails firm-level controls. It consists of the firm’s assets 
with a one-year lag to control for firm size as well as LCFs based on the amount of profit and 
losses before taxes reported in the preceding year. The LCFs account for the expected economic 
damage if transfer restrictions apply; the higher the losses accumulated in a company, the higher 
the value of future tax savings that are denied. I also control for the company’s age. These 
constraints induce a sample selection bias. The restriction to full information on the firm-level 
controls employed excludes micro and young companies. Consequently, the results have to be 
evaluated in light of this limitation. 
Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics for the dependent variable, VC funding, and the 
firm-level control variables, assets, LCFs, and age, which I employ in the following empirical 
                                                          
24E.g. the introduction of a cumulative regime represents a move from Category 0 to 1, thus leading to a treatment 
of +1. The change from an ownership-based restriction to a cumulative scheme poses a move from Category 3 
to Category 1, resulting in a treatment of -2. 
25Binning the endpoints accounts for the limited effect window. It assumes that the effect stays constant before 
and after the period explicitly modeled. 
26For more information, please refer to section 5.1 (Table 1), the appendix A1 (Table 12) and Bührle and Spen-
gel (2020). 
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analysis. The sample consists of many zeros for VC funding, as companies do not receive fund-
ing between different funding rounds. As a result, the median amounts to zero, while the mean 
is positive. Assets are highly skewed to the left and LCFs to the right, both towards zero. The 
age variable is also left-skewed, but less so than assets. As expected, VC-backed companies are 
rather young: More than half of the companies are aged below ten years.  
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Std. Dev. Min Mean Median Max 
VC funding 17,331 2,096.02 0.00 349.12 0.00 120,946.05 
Total Assets 17,331 13,940.60 0.00 421.08 3.37 1,206,064.00 
LCF amount (1 yr) 17,331 377.18 -19,660.24 -15.24 0.00 0.00 
Age 17,331 7.69 0.00 10.07 9.00 165.00 
Notes: Summary statistics for the variables, as defined in Table 11 (appendix).  
In the following tables, column (1) refers to the baseline specification with 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 or 
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦 as explanatory variables, accompanied by firm fixed effects. Addition-
ally, (2) includes year fixed effects. (3) adds country-level controls. (4) is the preferred specifi-
cation and consists of the full set of control variables and fixed effects.27 All variables are de-
fined as described before and as summarized in Table 11 in the appendix. Due to the use of 
one-year lagged control variables, I conduct the analyses from 1999 onwards. 
5.3 Main Analysis: Event Study and Generalized Difference-in-Differences 
Figure 7 (estimations based on equation (3)) depicts the estimates at the event time and before 
and after the legislation change. The x-axis represents the time to treatment, the y-axis the effect 
on the VC funding volume, standardized to the year preceding the change. A treatment intensity 
of one unit relates to the move from a restriction category to one higher category.  
The event study yields clear evidence for an impairment of VC funding caused by anti-tax loss 
trafficking restrictions. Statistically, the difference between treatment and control companies is 
not different from zero before the treatments. After a change in legislation, all estimates are 
negative and statistically significant. The graph shows post-event negative estimates ranging 
around -0.5, translating into an average reduction of -39.3%. Similarly, the overall treatment 
effect estimated in the panel regression is negative and statistically significant. The coefficient 
is slightly lower in magnitude, amounting to -0.44, in other words, a reduction of around -35.5% 
(Table 3, estimations based on equation (4)).  
                                                          
27Due to multicollinearity, I do not include country-year fixed effects. The changes in legislation considered here 
occur at the country level. Country-year fixed effects would be a perfect linear combination of the treatment 
variables. 
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Figure 7: Estimates event study, combined analysis 
 
Notes: Dependent variable: Firm-level VC funding volume. Results of the generalized event study; effect of 
change in legislation, taking treatment intensity into account. “0”: time of change in legislation. “-t”: leads. “t”: 
lags. 95% confidence intervals. Corresponding estimates: (Table 17, column 4; appendix). 
The estimator for 𝐿𝐶𝐵 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 indicates a significant positive relationship. In contrast to my re-
sults, Da Rin et al. (2006) do not find significant effects for either temporal restriction on losses. 
Surprisingly, the coefficient for relative restrictions on LCFs, LCF limit, is also positive and 
significant. Limitations on the offset of losses should reduce the value of LCFs and therefore, 
if anything, reduce investment. Similar to other studies, the significant negative estimate for 
CGT translates into a -6.8% decrease in VC funding for a 10% increase in the capital gains tax 
rate.28 In line with expectations, higher unemployment, proxying adverse economic conditions, 
and high inflation are associated with lower VC funding.  
On the firm level, all three control variables are highly statistically significant. The results in-
dicate that smaller and younger firms receive more funding. The amount of LCFs positively 
affects the level of investment; in other words, VC investors seem to value these tax assets' 
expected value, albeit the estimated effect size is relatively small. This finding supports my 
hypotheses, as the consideration of LCFs in the decision-making process is a pre-requisite for 
anti-tax loss trafficking regulations to matter.  
 
                                                          
28Edwards and Todtenhaupt (2020) investigate the exemption of capital gains in the US, which reduced the maxi-
mum tax on capital gains from 15% to 0%. They estimate an increase in VC funding of roughly 12% to 14% in 
response to the change in legislation. A direct comparison to existing country-level studies on VC financing is 
difficult, as the specific definition of VC as dependent variable differs widely. However, e.g. Da Rin et al. (2006) 
estimate that large increases in the capital gain tax rate decreases normalized high-tech PE investment by 22%. 
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Table 3: Generalized DiD results, restriction category, combined analysis 
 I - Restriction category 
 log(VC funding) 
  1 2 3 4 








































EIF number   0.000 0.000 
Lagged Public PE   0.000 0.000 
Lagged total assets    -0.000*** 
Age    -0.063*** 
LCF amount (1 yr)    0.000*** 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE   Yes Yes Yes 
# Observations 17,331 17,331 17,331 17,331 
Adj. R-squared 0.001 0.008 0.009 0.011 
 Notes: Results linear generalized DiD regression of restriction category (see Table 1) on the logarithm of VC 
funding volume received. Categories range from 0 to 4, a higher restriction category implies more restrictive anti-
tax loss trafficking rules. Controls as indicated. Definition of variables: Table 11 (appendix). *, **, and *** indi-
cate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level. Standard errors: Clustered at country level.  
To relate the results to the case studies previously conducted, I replace the Restriction Category 
with dummy variables for each legislation change. In the respective countries, the dummy is 
equal to one at the time of change and the following periods, and zero otherwise. Insufficient 
accounting information before 2006 limits the number of changes that I can explore.29 As ap-
parent in Table 4, the main effect is identified by introducing cumulative regimes in Hungary 
and Croatia and shifting to an ownership-based restriction in Germany. The direction of the 
                                                          
29While I am able to match most of the names of VC-funded companies to company names in Orbis, almost all of 
them are missing accounting data from 1998 to 2006. Only 2% of the observations in the panel sample date 
before 2006.  
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coefficients aligns with expectations,30 albeit the estimates' size is far larger and more signifi-
cant than in the case studies. The estimated decreases amount to -66.1% (Germany), -24.0% 
(Hungary), and -50.4% (Croatia). 
Table 4: Generalized DiD results, country dummies, combined analysis 
  II - Country dummy 
 log(VC funding) 
  1 2 3 4 
CZ 0.000 -0.483** -0.370 -0.272 
DE -0.937*** -0.623*** -1.090*** -1.083*** 
GR -0.428*** -0.127* 0.309 0.328 
HU (2012) 0.080*** 0.454*** -0.262* -0.275* 
HR -0.984*** -0.743*** -0.708*** -0.702*** 
Country-level controls   Yes Yes 
Firm-level controls    Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE   Yes Yes Yes 
# Observations 17,331 17,331 17,331 17,331 
Adj. R-squared 0.001 0.008 0.009 0.010 
Notes: Results linear generalized DiD regressions of legislation change dummies on the logarithm of VC funding 
volume received. Legislation change dummies equal 1 in the year when anti-tax loss trafficking rules changed and 
all following years in the country specified, and 0 otherwise. Controls as indicated. Definition of variables: Table 
11 (appendix). *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level. Standard errors: Clustered at country 
level.  
As already mentioned, the restriction to full information on the firm-level control variables 
poses a severe limitation. These results underline the sample selection bias inherent in the com-
bined analysis. The stronger effects indicate that the sub-sample with complete coverage of the 
required accounting variables is particularly affected by anti-tax loss trafficking rules. The ex-
cluded companies are relatively young (42% are aged up to five years, 71% up to ten years). 
Based on the data, it is impossible to determine any other differences in characteristics between 
the selected and the excluded companies beyond this aspect. Any conclusions drawn from the 
panel analysis results have to be evaluated in light of this limitation: The companies driving the 
negative estimates are likely more mature and thus at a later VC financing stage where tax 
aspects might be more relevant compared to very early funding rounds.   
                                                          
30In Hungary, the coefficient is positive and highly significant before controlling for time-varying country-specific 
factors. This can be attributed to the launch of JEREMIE (Joint European Resources for Micro to Medium En-
terprises) VC funds in 2010, 2012 and 2013, right around the time of the introduction of the cumulative regime.  
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5.4 Heterogeneity Analyses 
I extend the main analysis results by exploring whether the effects depend on the companies' 
characteristics. I focus on the funding volume received (section 5.4.1), age (section 5.4.2), and 
industry affiliation (section 5.4.3) of the funded firms.  
5.4.1 Funding Volume 
To further analyze these findings, I split the sample based on the total VC funding received by 
a company.31 I divide sub-samples into companies receiving a total VC funding volume below 
the 25th percentile, between the 25th and 50th percentile, between the 50th and 75th percentile, 
and above the 75th percentile. The summary statistics in Table 5 shows that companies in the 
lowest percentile are, on average, much bigger and also older compared to the others. By con-
trast, companies in the highest percentile report considerably higher losses. 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics, VC funding volume percentiles 
Variable Obs Std. Dev. Min Mean Median Max 
Panel 1: Below 25% 
VC funding 10074 51.29 0.00 8.12 0.00 500.00 
Total Assets 10074 18,251.46 0.00 646.28 3.62 1,206,064.00 
LCF amount (1 yr) 10074 362.57 -19,660.24 -13.45 0.00 0.00 
Age 10074 8.05 0.00 10.94 10.00 165.00 
Panel 2: 25% to 50% 
VC funding 2645 360.22 0.00 153.35 0.00 1,514.16 
Total Assets 2645 284.51 0.00 39.49 1.66 7,850.00 
LCF amount (1 yr) 2645 49.07 -1,624.00 -2.43 0.00 0.00 
Age 2645 7.77 0.00 9.10 7.00 78.00 
Panel 3: 50% to 75% 
VC funding 2634 1,103.47 0.00 474.61 0.00 5,188.70 
Total Assets 2634 618.21 0.00 88.80 2.89 9,269.00 
LCF amount (1 yr) 2634 67.53 -2,757.00 -4.19 -0.03 0.00 
Age 2634 6.56 0.00 8.32 7.00 58.00 
Panel 4: Above 75% 
VC funding 2037 5,644.30 0.00 2,120.07 0.00 120,946.05 
Total Assets 2037 2,212.13 0.00 220.31 7.42 42,751.00 
LCF amount (1 yr) 2037 741.35 -16,289.00 -54.56 -0.16 0.00 
Age 2037 6.32 0.00 9.16 8.00 56.00 
Notes: Summary statistics for firm-level variables, as defined in Table 11 (appendix). Panel 1: Companies with 
total VC funding volume below 25th percentile. Panel 2: Companies with total VC funding volume between 25th 
and 50th percentile. Panel 3: Companies with total VC funding volume between 50th and 75th. Panel 4: Companies 
with total VC funding volume above 75th percentile. 
Figure 8 depicts the coefficients for Restriction category, estimated based on specification I-4 
in the different sub-samples. With increasing VC funding volume, the estimates get less precise 
                                                          
31I add up the funding volume received by a company across all rounds and years. The distribution of total VC 
funding per company is highly left skewed with a median of 7.86th€ and a mean of 1,871.32th€.  
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as apparent from broader confidence intervals. All coefficient estimates are negative. Generally, 
the coefficients increase in the VC funding volume, albeit start-ups between the 25th and 50th 
percentile seem the most severely affected. Here, the average decrease is estimated at -79.1%.  
Figure 8: Estimates in sub-samples based on VC funding volume percentile 
 
Notes: Results linear generalized DiD regressions of restriction category (see Table 1) on the logarithm of VC 
funding volume received based on specification I-4. Categories range from 0 to 4, a higher restriction category 
implies more restrictive anti-tax loss trafficking rules. Sub-samples: Split based on percentiles of total VC funding 
volume as indicated. 95% confidence intervals. Descriptive statistics and corresponding estimates: Table 5 and 
Table 18 in the appendix. 
The significant estimates below the 25th percentile and above the 75th percentile translate into 
effects of -11.4% and -63.2%, respectively.VC investors do not seem to care that much about 
anti-tax loss trafficking rules until they invest larger sums (the mean of total VC funding volume 
below the 25th percentile amounts to € 8.000). Conceptually, this is convincing as lower sums 
entail, on an absolute level, lower risk for the investor. 
5.4.2 Age Structure 
The majority of the sample start-ups are aged below or up to ten years (65.64%). Around a 
quarter of the companies is older than ten years. Over the time horizon included in their sample 
(1993 to 1999), Cooper and Knittel (2010) show that firms aged up to five years increasingly 
reported tax losses, particularly in the information and professional services sector. The overall 
share of losses remained below the percentage reported for older companies, on average. In 
contrast, the young firms required comparatively more time to offset their losses and had lower 
utilization rates. All in all, they find that new firms are more greatly affected by the asymmetric 
treatment of tax losses. Therefore, tax loss transfer restrictions could more severely impair VC 
funding of young companies than mature firms. However, the closer investors approach the exit, 
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the divestment’s potential consequences get in the focus. While tax structuring might not be as 
relevant in earlier investment stages, it might gain importance down the road. 
Table 6: Descriptive statistics, different age groups 
Variable Obs Std. Dev. Min Mean Median Max 
Panel 1: Age 0 to 5 years 
VC funding 4541 2,004.45 0.00 508.36 0.00 28,603.67 
Total Assets 4541 17,949.66 0.00 403.75 0.97 1,206,064.00 
LCF amount (1 yr) 4541 456.46 -19,660.24 -25.04 -0.06 0.00 
Age 4541 1.39 0.00 3.24 3.00 5.00 
Panel 2: Age 5 to 10 years 
VC funding 7100 2,584.36 0.00 430.71 0.00 120,946.05 
Total Assets 7100 1,230.07 0.00 101.37 2.84 42,751.00 
LCF amount (1 yr) 7100 406.93 -16,289.00 -17.18 -0.01 0.00 
Age 7100 1.65 5.00 7.45 7.00 10.00 
Panel 3: Age 10 to 15 years 
VC funding 5027 1,796.12 0.00 223.90 0.00 55,000.00 
Total Assets 5027 977.49 0.00 91.39 5.09 28,420.00 
LCF amount (1 yr) 5027 145.58 -9,784.51 -4.59 0.00 0.00 
Age 5027 1.67 10.00 12.20 12.00 15.00 
Panel 4: Age above 15 years 
VC funding 3391 1,134.10 0.00 160.17 0.00 20,145.96 
Total Assets 3391 23,615.85 0.00 1,358.25 9.20 676,747.00 
LCF amount (1 yr) 3391 431.50 -15,642.50 -14.80 0.00 0.00 
Age 3391 10.24 15.00 20.74 18.00 165.00 
Notes: Summary statistics for firm-level variables, as defined in Table 11 (appendix). Panel 1: Companies aged 
up to five years. Panel 2: Companies aged between five and ten years. Panel 3: Companies aged between ten and 
15 years. Panel 4: Companies aged above 15 years. 
The negative coefficients for the age variable in previous regressions already indicate that, on 
average, older companies receive less funding. Therefore, I subdivide the sample into four cat-
egories based on five-year age groups. Table 6 depicts the descriptive statistics. As already 
found in previous specifications, younger companies receive, on average, higher VC funding 
and carry higher losses. However, there are apparent size differences. The first age group (zero 
to five years) has, on average, more than triple the amount of assets than each of the following 
two age groups (five to 15 years), but less than a third than the last age group (above 15 years). 
Overall, the age of a company seems to matter not only for the VC funding volume, besides 
other factors, but also for the severity of VC funding impairment in response to the introduction 
of anti-tax loss trafficking rules (Figure 9). Estimates for Restriction category are all negative 
but vary in size and significance between the age groups. I find the strongest effect for the age 
group between ten and 15 years. For these companies, the exit time is likely near, so investors 
start to incorporate the additional risk due to transfer restrictions in their decision process. 
30 
Figure 9: Estimates in sub-samples based on age 
 
Notes: Results linear generalized DiD regressions of restriction category (see Table 1) on the logarithm of VC 
funding volume received based on specification I-4. Categories range from 0 to 4, a higher restriction category 
implies more restrictive anti-tax loss trafficking rules. Sub-samples: Split based on age as indicated. 95% confi-
dence intervals. Descriptive statistics and corresponding estimates: Table 6 and Table 19 in the appendix. 
Table 7: Generalized DiD results, country dummies, age 
 0 to 5 years 5 to 10 years 10 to 15 years Above 15 years 
 log(VC funding) 
  II-4 II-4 II-4 II-4 
CZ -1.784*** -0.106 omitted omitted 
DE -2.564** -0.361 -2.014*** -0.567 
GR omitted omitted omitted 0.123 
HU (2012) 0.308 0.405 -0.506** 1.212*** 
HR -2.796*** 0.418 omitted 0.970** 
Country-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# Observations 4,541 7,100 5,027 3,391 
Adj. R-squared 0.009 0.014 0.009 0.000 
Notes: Results linear generalized DiD regressions of country dummies on the logarithm of VC funding volume 
received. Controls as indicated. Definition of variables: Table 11 (appendix). Differentiation depending on age of 
companies as indicated. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level. Standard errors: Clustered 
at country level. “Omitted”: Variable was omitted from the regression due to multi-collinearity. 
Interestingly, the results suggest a shift of VC funding between the different age groups when 
focusing on individual changes (Table 7). In all sub-samples, the coefficients are negative for 
the regime changes in the Czech Republic and Germany. However, in Hungary and Croatia, 
funds seem to have been shifted from younger to older companies: The significant estimates 
are negative in younger age groups but turn positive for the oldest companies. The positive 
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coefficients cause the overall insignificant impact of Restriction Category. Investors choosing 
to invest in comparatively less risky companies at later development stages could explain these 
opposing effects. 
5.4.3 Industry Heterogeneity 
So far, I have considered the impact of tax loss restrictions across all sectors. Research shows 
that industries differ in loss probabilities and the use of LCFs. The proprietary data used in 
Cooper and Knittel (2010) shows differences between reported tax losses as well as their utili-
zation. Dreßler and Overesch (2013) find cyclical effects in the probability of making losses, 
which is more pronounced in some sectors (e.g., data processing) compared to others (e.g., 
food). All in all, the literature suggests that anti-tax loss regulations will have different effects, 
depending on the industry-specific relevance of LCFs.  
Although the firm fixed effects employed in all specifications should account for industry-spe-
cific characteristics, it could still be worthwhile to investigate the diverging impact on a broader 
basis. For this purpose, I employ Eurostat’s high-tech aggregation system to differentiate be-
tween low- and high-tech industries. I define high- and medium-high-technology manufactur-
ing sectors and high-tech knowledge-intensive services as high-tech industries. (Table 20 in the 
appendix). I classify all other companies as part of low-tech sectors. Comparing the means in 
the low- to the high-tech sample (Table 8) shows that start-ups in high-tech industries are, on 
average, considerably smaller, younger, carry higher estimated LCFs, and receive more VC 
funding. 
Table 8: Descriptive statistics, low- vs. high-tech industries 
Variable Obs Std. Dev. Min Mean Median Max 
Panel 1: Low-tech companies 
VC funding 9,358 1,743.47 0.00 312.87 0.00 33,896.11 
Total Assets 9,358 18,936.78 0.00 702.23 4.18 1,206,064.00 
LCF amount (1 yr) 9,358 375.19 -19,660.24 -13.69 0.00 0.00 
Age 9,358 8.68 0.00 10.68 9.00 165.00 
Panel 2: High-tech companies 
VC funding 7,895 2,456.92 0.00 395.17 0.00 120,946.05 
Total Assets 7,895 1,173.52 0.00 91.58 2.70 42,751.00 
LCF amount (1 yr) 7,895 381.39 -16,289.00 -17.22 -0.03 0.00 
Age 7,895 6.27 0.00 9.34 8.00 86.00 
Notes: Summary statistics for firm-level variables, as defined in Table 11 (appendix). Panel 1: Companies in low-
tech industries. Panel 2: Companies in high-tech industries. Definition of industries: Table 20 (appendix). 
Figure 10 depicts the regression results for the low- and high-tech sample. The low-tech in-
dustry coefficeient is less significant and closer to zero. In other words, firms in technologi-
cally more advanced industries are the ones that are severely affected. The high-tech sector 
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results are slightly larger than the effect estimated in the main specification (Table 3). Anec-
dotal evidence confirms that tax loss transfer restrictions lead to a clear competitive disad-
vantage for investors in innovative sectors.32  
Figure 10: Estimates in sub-samples based on industry 
 
Notes: Results linear generalized DiD regressions of restriction category (see Table 1) on the logarithm of VC 
funding volume received based on specification I-4. Categories range from 0 to 4, a higher restriction category 
implies more restrictive anti-tax loss trafficking rules. Sub-samples: Split based on age as indicated. 95% confi-
dence intervals. Descriptive statistics and corresponding estimates: Table 8 and Table 21 in the appendix. 
5.5 Robustness Checks 
I conduct several tests to confirm my results: I repeat the main analysis with a non-linear model, 
the Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator (section 5.5.1). I follow up with 
alternative approximation methods for a firm’s LCFs (section 5.5.2).  
5.5.1 Alternative Model: Poisson 
The data employed for the empirical analysis contains, by construction, a high share of zeros 
recorded for VC funding (89.89% of the company-year observations). To account for the highly 
skewed distribution, I employ the PPML estimator proposed by Silva and Tenreyro (2006).33 
Analogously to the main specification, I apply formula (4).  
                                                          
32Research in areas such as biotechnology commonly requires large up-front investment and entails high risk. 
Thoughout the investment stages, the start-ups  are generally in a loss position, triggering anti-tax loss trafficking 
rules when ownership changes during fundraising rounds or investor exits: NVCA, https://nvca.org/pressre-
leases/nvca-cheers-prioritization-startup-loss-carryforward-rule-reforms/ (05.11.2020). In addition, if projects 
fail, large companies can offset their losses with other profits. By contrast, VC investors cannot recover their 
losses from investments in small start-ups: FAZ, https://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/unternehmen/wie-
helmut-jeggle-ueber-die-biontech-aktie-denkt-17007068.html (19.10.2020). 
33 Poisson models are generally chosen in a setting with count variables on the left hand side of the equation, 
whereas the application of a pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator allows for a more general application 
(Shepherd, 2016). 
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Table 9 depicts the results. The number of observations amounts to roughly half compared to 
the linear model. The coefficients for the restriction categories are negative and highly signifi-
cant. However, estimates are larger than in the corresponding linear estimate (Table 3). Mov-
ing from a lower to a higher restriction category translates into a decrease in VC funding of 
around 52.2%. The control variables' coefficients (except for age) also align in size and signif-
icance with the estimates in the main analysis.  
Table 9: Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood estimation 
 I - Restriction category 
 log(VC funding) 
  1 2 3 4 








































EIF number   0.000** 0.000** 
Lagged Public PE   0.000 0.000 
Lagged total assets    -0.000 
Age    -6.256*** 
LCF amount (1 yr)    -0.001 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE   Yes Yes Yes 
# Observations 8,859 8,805 8,805 8,805 
Adj. R-squared 0.0908 0.107 0.113 0.124 
Notes: Results Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood regressions of restriction category (see Table 1) on the VC 
funding volume received in its logarithm. Categories range from 0 to 4, a higher restriction category implies more 
restrictive anti-tax loss trafficking rules. Controls as indicated. Definition of variables: Table 11 (appendix). *, **, 
and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level. Standard errors: Clustered at country level. 
5.5.2 Alternative Loss Carryforward Definitions 
So far, LCFs have been calculated based on the preceding year’s profits (LCF amount (1 yr)). 
Alternatively, LCFs can be calculated incorporating more periods. Also, instead of including 
the amount of LCFs available, a dummy variable set equal to one if a LCF is available and zero 
otherwise can be defined. Rechbauer (2017) investigates the LCF proxies employed in the lit-
erature and shows that methods relying on accounting data might not identify the true amount 
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of LCFs. She demonstrates that the rate of correct predictions is higher if she approximates 
LCFs with a 0/1 dummy. Calculating the actual amount of LCFs instead of only defining their 
existence is found to be subject to greater estimation error. The majority of empirical studies 
basing LCF variables on financial statement information use a dummy predicted from the pre-
ceding year’s earnings (Haring, Niemann, & Runger, 2012; Krämer, 2015; Merz & Overesch, 
2016). I construct LCF amounts and dummies based on the preceding two and four years and 
re-run the main specification in alternative specifications. My calculations follow Bernasconi, 
Marenzi, and Pagani’s (2005) method.34 
Table 10: Generalized DiD results, alternative LCF* definitions 
  I -Restriction category 
  log(VC funding) 
  4 # Observations 
Panel 1: One year    
LCF amount -0.435*** 17,331 
LCF dummy -0.435*** 17,331 
Panel 2: Two years   
LCF amount -0.249** 12,591 
LCF dummy -0.249** 12,591 
Panel 3: Four years   
LCF amount 0.204 6,968 
LCF dummy 0.203 6,968 
Notes: Notes: Results linear generalized DiD regressions of anti-tax loss trafficking rules on the VC funding vol-
ume received. “Restriction category”: As defined in Table 1. Categories range from 0 to 4, a higher restriction 
category implies more restrictive anti-tax loss trafficking rules. Full set of controls included. Definition of variables: 
Table 11 (appendix). Panel 1: 1-year-based LCF measures. Panel 2: 2-year-based LCF measures. Panel 3: 4-year-
based LCF measures. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level. Standard errors: Clustered at 
country level. 
Table 10 presents the results for estimated LCF amounts and the related LCF dummies. For 
reference, the first group in Panel 1 shows the main regression results (as stated in Table 3). In 
neither panel, the results change when exchanging the amount of LCFs for a binary dummy 
variable. Choosing between the presence of LCFs instead of their size seems only marginally 
to affect the results. Extending the time horizon decreases the estimate for two-year-based 
measures (Panel 2). The coefficients turn positive and insignificant when taking four years into 
account (Panel 3).  
However, extending the period for LCF calculations also decreases the sample size. The 
measures' construction necessitates two respective four years of non-missing information on 
profits and losses before taxes. Around 20% of the companies observed are younger than five 
                                                          
34Please refer to appendix A3 for a calculation example. 
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years. If especially newly created companies carry losses (since they are yet not profitable), 
anti-tax loss trafficking rules will be particularly relevant for younger companies. Extending 
the requirements for the availability of accounting information will exclude precisely those 
cases. Also, if there are shifting effects from recently established to older companies or vice 
versa, extending the required number of years and contiguous non-missing accounting infor-
mation will bias the results.  
6. Summary and Discussion 
Anti-tax loss trafficking rules have been criticized for deterring start-up financing by VC inves-
tors. The potential disallowance of the use of LCFs increases the investment risk, as accumu-
lated losses could end up not being tax-deductible. Since young innovative companies are con-
sidered an important driver of a country’s economic development, such obstacles should be 
eliminated to foster a vibrant environment for entrepreneurship. 
In this study, I have investigated the effect of restrictions on the transfer of tax losses after a 
change in ownership or activity on VC funding. I expected anti-tax loss trafficking regulations 
to impair start-up financing and more lenient restrictions to have a smaller effect. To test my 
hypotheses, I conducted individual case studies as well as a combined analysis. I employed a 
DiD design to analyze the relationship between anti-tax loss trafficking rules and the VC fund-
ing volume in the EU28 Member States. An event study approach accompanied these analyses. 
I find that anti-tax loss trafficking rules indeed negatively affect the VC funding volume re-
ceived by start-ups. The coefficient is statistically and economically significant, supporting my 
first hypothesis. With an estimated average decrease of more than -35.5%%, the effect's mag-
nitude is also economically significant. Stricter regulation types seem to drive the results. 
I do not consider reverse causality to be a problem in my setting. Anti-tax loss trafficking rules 
target tax-motivated acquisitions, where companies without economic activity are bought only 
because of their LCFs. Adverse impacts on VC transactions are unintended side effects, but 
they are commonly not named the reason for changes in legislation. The lack of consideration 
of the VC market in this context already shows in the exemptions granted, which usually target 
large companies that are quoted, part of a group, or undergo financial rehabilitation.  
I extend the analysis by investigating the impact on the VC funding, depending on the total 
funding volume a company received, age, and industry affiliation. All extensions reveal heter-
ogeneous effects: First, highly-funded companies tend, on average, to be more severely affected 
than those that received only little VC funding. Second, VC investors decrease investments in 
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response to tax loss transfer restrictions more strongly in older companies. If the investor's exit 
approaches, tax factors might be considered more important for the investment decision than 
during evaluations in earlier stages. There also seems to be a shift in VC funding from younger 
to older companies after introducing regimes that deny loss carryforwards after a cumulative 
change in ownership and activity. Third, my findings suggest that companies in high-tech in-
dustries are predominantly affected. 
The main results also hold when applying a Poisson model. In the main specification, I use 
profits and losses of the previous period to construct a measure of each companies’ LCF. Ex-
tending this time horizon, which requires several years of profit and loss data for the observed 
companies, weakens the results. However, the additional constraint leads to a decrease in sam-
ple size and the exclusion of very young companies. Both could explain the reduced size and 
significance of the estimates.  
Considering the negative effects, relaxing anti-tax loss trafficking restrictions could serve as 
one step towards improving funding possibilities for European start-ups. Although several 
EU28 Member States lessened their regulations over the years, as of 2018, six countries still 
deny the transfer of losses after a change in ownership (Bührle & Spengel, 2020). Efforts have 
already been undertaken to prevent the anti-abuse regulations from unintentionally disad-
vantaging start-ups with high accumulated tax LCFs. Nevertheless, regulators should strive to 
explicitly exclude them from the scope of their rules while keeping the administrative burdens 
start-ups might face in this context to a minimum. While my analysis focuses on Europe, similar 
restrictions exist worldwide. In light of the Corona crisis, tax loss restrictions such as anti-tax 
loss trafficking rules could pose one element in a government’s strategy to support the economy. 
First, the topic will gain relevance: losses are on the rise across industries. Second, anti-ax loss 
trafficking rules pose an even more pressing problem for innovative start-ups conducting high-
risk research. In times where the world is eagerly awaiting a vaccine for Corona, VC funding 




A1 Supplementary Tables 
Table 11: Variable definition 
Variable Description 
Dependent variable 
log(𝑉𝐶 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔) Logarithm of VC funding received, measured in thousand €, win-
sorized at the 1 and 99 percent level (Source: VICO 4.0) 
Main variables of interest 
𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 Dummy that takes the value 1 in the period loss transfer re-
strictions are changed; 0 otherwise. Type of change as indicated 
in the text (Source: Bührle & Spengel (2020)) 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 Treatment intensity; defined as the difference between the old 
and new restriction category after a change in legislation 
(Source: Bührle & Spengel (2020)) 
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦  Loss transfer restriction category; Category 0 = No explicit anti-
loss trafficking rule, 1 = Denial of loss transfer after a change in 
ownership and activity (cumulative), 2 = Denial of loss transfer 
after a change in activity, 3 = Denial of loss transfer after a 
change in ownership, 4 = Denial of loss transfer after a change 
in ownership or activity (see Table 1; Source: Bührle & Spengel 
(2020)) 
Country-level controls 
𝐶𝐼𝑇 Statutory corporate income tax rate in % (Source: European 
Commission) 
 𝐶𝐼𝑇 Change in CIT, i.e., CIT in t minus CIT in t-1 
𝐶𝐺𝑇  Statutory capital gains tax rate in % (Source: European Commis-
sion) 
𝐷𝑇  Statutory dividend income tax rate in % (Source: European Com-
mission) 
𝐸𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑒 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒 Dummy that takes the value 1 in the period anti-loss trafficking 
rules incorporate escape clauses for listed companies, group re-
structuring, recovery plans, hidden reserves, or the provision of 
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evidence for economic reasons; 0 otherwise (Source: Bührle & 
Spengel (2020)) 
𝐿𝐶𝐹 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠  Number of years a LCF is available, 50 if unlimited (Source: 
IBFD, tax guides) 
𝐿𝐶𝐵 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠  Number of years a LCB is available, 0 if not available (Source: 
IBFD, tax guides) 
𝐿𝐶𝐹 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡 Dummy that takes the value 1 if relative restrictions apply to 
LCFs, 0 otherwise (Source: IBFD, tax guides) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝ita GDP per capita in thousand dollars, based on purchasing power 
parity and constant 2011 dollar (Source: World Bank) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ Percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices, based on con-
stant 2010 dollar (Source: World Bank) 
𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 Total unemployment, measured as percentage of total labor force 
(Source: World Bank) 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 Inflation, measured as percentage change in consumer price in-
dex (Source: World Bank) 
𝐸𝐼𝐹 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡  Amount of support provided by the EIF, all business lines 
(Source: EIF) 
𝐸𝐼𝐹 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟   Number  of supported SMEs by the EIF, all business lines 
(Source: EIF) 
𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑃𝐸  Amount of public PE investments with a one-year lag (Source: 
InvestEurope) 
Firm-level controls 
𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠  Total assets recorded in the balance sheet, in million € and with 
a one-year lag (Source: VICO 4.0, Orbis) 
𝐿𝐶𝐹 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 (1 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟)  LCF of company based on losses of the previous year (Source: 
VICO 4.0, Orbis)  
𝐴𝑔𝑒 Age of the company (Source: VICO 4.0, Orbis) 
Notes: Definition and source of variables employed in empirical specifications.  
39 
Table 12: Categorization of anti-tax loss trafficking rules in the EU28, 1998-2014 
 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 
AT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
BE 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
BG 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
CY 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
CZ 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
DE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
DK 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
EE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ES 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
FI 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
FR 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
GB 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
GR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
HR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
HU 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
IE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
IT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
LT 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
LU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
LV 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
MT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NL 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
PL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PT 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
RO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SE 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
SI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
SK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Notes: Categorization of anti-tax loss trafficking rules in the EU28 from 1998 to 2014. Category 0: No explicit 
anti-loss trafficking rule. Category 1: Denial of loss transfer after change in ownership and activity (cumulative 
requirement). Category 2: Denial of loss transfer after change in activity. Category 3: Denial of loss transfer after 
change in ownership. Category 4: Denial of loss transfer after change in ownership or activity (fulfillment of one 
criterion is sufficient). Retro-actively applicable rules are disregarded. Source: Bührle and Spengel (2020).  
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Table 13: Sample composition, case studies 
Country Number of observations Percentage 
Case Study: Czech Republic 
CZ 300 8.93 
ES 2,900 86.31 
GR 95 2.83 
HR 49 1.46 
SK 16 0.48 
Total 3,360 100 
Case Study: Germany 
AT 740 1.2 
BE 2,331 3.78 
DE 7,147 11.57 
FR 16,292 26.39 
GB 31,085 50.34 
IT 2,019 3.27 
NL 2,133 3.45 
Total 61,747 100 
Case Study: Slovenia 
CY 64 16.58 
GR 16 4.15 
HU 118 30.57 
PL 134 34.72 
SI 48 12.44 
SK 6 1.55 
Total 386 100 
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Table 14: Descriptive statistics, case studies 
Variable Obs Std. Dev. Min Mean Median Max 
Case Study: Czech Republic 
Panel 1: Treatment group 
VC funding 300 3,590.58 0.00 497.96 0.00 49,148.71 
Total Assets 53 13.44 0.26 18.16 17.95 48.72 
LCF amount (1 yr) 53 1.53 -9.19 -0.57 0.00 0.00 
Age 300 5.46 0.00 10.74 11.00 24.00 
Panel 2: Control group 
VC funding 3,060 2,386.13 0.00 316.92 0.00 64,630.94 
Total Assets 1,018 391.03 0.00 70.29 5.53 11,166.00 
LCF amount (1 yr) 1,016 19.15 -394.00 -2.91 0.00 0.00 
Age 3,060 5.72 0.00 9.74 10.00 28.00 
Case Study: Germany 
Panel 1: Treatment group 
VC funding 7,147 5,738.53 0.00 761.06 0.00 317,340.72 
Total Assets 2,391 25,956.03 0.00 1,089.10 1.83 676,747.00 
LCF amount (1 yr) 745 17.36 -455.00 -1.50 0.00 0.00 
Age 6,417 6.75 0.00 8.23 8.00 165.00 
Panel 2: Control group 
VC funding 54,600 3,023.72 0.00 468.74 0.00 309,271.72 
Total Assets 18,948 12,400.63 0.00 164.70 1.77 1,206,118.00 
LCF amount (1 yr) 12,776 259.06 -19,660.24 -8.55 0.00 0.00 
Age 51,124 5.46 0.00 7.98 7.00 97.00 
Case Study: Slovenia 
Panel 1: Treatment group 
VC funding 48 921.84 0.00 240.51 0.00 4,284.42 
Total Assets 5 0.11 0.94 1.06 1.02 1.19 
LCF amount (1 yr) 5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Age 48 6.00 1.00 13.50 13.50 25.00 
Panel 2: Control group 
VC funding 338 1,527.43 0.00 223.65 0.00 21,654.12 
Total Assets 51 141.14 0.51 96.63 25.10 483.54 
LCF amount (1 yr) 51 1.47 -8.17 -0.36 0.00 0.00 
Age 338 5.85 1.00 13.93 14.00 25.00 
Notes: Summary statistics for the variables, as defined in Table 11. Differentiated between case study and treat-
ment (Panel 1) and control group (Panel 2). 
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Table 15: Results event study, case studies 
 Event study 
 log(VC funding) 
  CZ DE SI 
t-4 2.048 0.037 1.903 
t-3 0.149 0.139 1.114 
t-2 0.230 -0.075 -0.134 
t -1.326*** -0.273 -1.331** 
t+1 0.084 -0.243 -2.139** 
t+2 -1.783** -0.466** 3.241 
t+3 -1.994 -0.350 1.056 
t+4 -2.030* -0.549** 1.398* 
Escape clause 0.155 omitted -0.678 
LCF years -0.038 0.019** -0.068** 
LCB years omitted -0.043 omitted 
LCF limit -0.059 0.065 1.650 
CIT -0.098 0.008 0.113*** 
CIT 0.017 -0.014 -0.146 
CGT -5.034 -0.129 0.995 
DIT 0.566 0.654 -3.751 
GDP per capita -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
GDP growth 0.198*** 0.009 -0.022 
Unemployment -0.044 -0.058** -0.066 
Inflation 0.320* -0.047 0.211** 
EIF amount -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
EIF number 0.000 -0.000 0.001 
Lagged Public PE -0.000 0.000** - 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes 
# Observations 3,360 61,747 386 
Adj. R-squared 0.030 0.071 0.093 
Notes: Dependent variable: Firm-level VC funding volume. Results of the event study, difference between treat-
ment and control group. “t”: time of change in legislation. “t-x”: leads. “t+x”: lags. Controls as indicated. Defini-
tion of variables: Table 11. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level. Standard errors: Clus-
tered at country level. “Omitted”: Variable was omitted from the regression due to multi-collinearity.  
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Table 16: DiD results, restriction category, case studies 
 I - Restriction category 
 log(VC funding) 
  CZ DE SI 
Treatment dummy -0.731 -0.524*** -0.479 
Escape clause 0.008 -0.159 -0.629 
LCF years -0.012 0.020*** -0.011 
LCB years omitted -0.035 omitted 
LCF limit -0.418 0.075 1.286** 
CIT -0.017 0.006 0.070* 
CIT -0.032 -0.016 -0.136 
CGT -4.376 -0.096 0.977 
DIT -0.649 0.662 -3.830 
GDP per capita 0.000 0.000 -0.000* 
GDP growth 0.069 -0.002 0.004 
Unemployment -0.005 -0.054** -0.058 
Inflation 0.179 -0.064 0.164** 
EIF amount 0.001 0.000 -0.002 
EIF number 0.000 -0.000 0.001** 
Lagged Public PE -0.000 0.000** - 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes 
# Observations 3,360 61,747 386 
Adj. R-squared 0.027 0.071 0.075 
Notes: Results linear DiD regressions of treatment dummy on the logarithm of VC funding volume received. 
Treatment dummy equals 1 in the year of change in legislation and all following years, and zero otherwise. Con-
trols as indicated. Definition of variables: Table 11 (appendix). *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, 
and 1% level. Standard errors: Clustered at country level. “Omitted”: Variable was omitted from the regression 
due to multi-collinearity. 
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Table 17: Results event study, combined analysis 
 Event study 
  log(VC funding) 
  1 2 3 4 
t-4 -0.274*** -0.145* -0.134 -0.131 
t-3 -0.114 -0.095 -0.101 -0.099 
t-2 -0.099 -0.127 -0.145 -0.143 
t -0.345** -0.264* -0.311 -0.318 
t+1 -0.472*** -0.336* -0.469** -0.471** 
t+2 -0.444** -0.315* -0.549*** -0.545*** 
t+3 -0.467** -0.291 -0.602*** -0.595*** 
t+4 -0.497*** -0.291* -0.568*** -0.559*** 
Escape clause   0.229 0.226 
LCF years   0.004 0.004 
LCB years   0.110* 0.110* 
LCF limit   0.303** 0.316** 
CIT   -0.016 -0.018 
CIT   0.006 0.004 
CGT   -0.717 -0.794 
DIT   -0.142 -0.138 
GDP per capita   0.000 0.000 
GDP growth   0.020 0.020 
Unemployment   -0.037* -0.038* 
Inflation   -0.069* -0.068* 
EIF amount   -0.000 -0.000 
EIF number   0.000 0.000 
Lagged Public PE   0.000 0.000 
Lagged total assets    -0.000 
Age    -0.062*** 
LCF amount (1 yr)    0.000 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE   Yes Yes Yes 
# Observations 17,331 17,331 17,331 17,331 
Adj. R-squared 0.002 0.008 0.009 0.010 
Notes: Results of the event study of treatment intensity on the logarithm of VC funding volume received “t”: time 
of change in legislation. “t-x”: leads. “t+x”: lags. Controls as indicated. Definition of variables: Table 11. *, **, 




Table 18: Generalized DiD results, restriction category, VC funding volume percentiles 
 Below 25% 25% to 50% 50% to 75% Above 75% 
 log(VC funding) 
  I-4 I-4 I-4 I-4 
Restriction category -0.121* -1.565*** -0.326 -1.000** 
Escape clause 0.238** -0.833** 1.137* -0.135 
LCF years 0.009** 0.020 -0.092** 0.033 
LCB years -0.094*** 0.787*** 0.279** 0.252 
LCF limit -0.063 1.291*** 1.866*** 0.167 
CIT -0.041* 0.072 -0.127 0.156* 
CIT 0.010 -0.094*** 0.036 -0.107*** 
CGT 0.867 -5.802*** -2.553 -4.189 
DIT 0.303 -0.885 -1.505 0.655 
GDP per capita 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000* 
GDP growth -0.007 -0.029 -0.072 0.140 
Unemployment -0.018 -0.129* -0.201** 0.054 
Inflation -0.037* -0.166 -0.289 0.021 
EIF amount -0.000* 0.001** -0.000 -0.001 
EIF number 0.000** -0.000 0.000 0.000 
Lagged Public PE -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
Lagged total assets -0.000** 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
Age -0.049*** -0.053*** -0.048 -0.289** 
LCF amount (1 yr) -0.000 -0.004*** 0.001* 0.000 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE   Yes Yes Yes 
# Observations 10,074 2,645 2,634 2,037 
Adj. R-squared 0.010 0.017 0.016 0.040 
Notes: Results linear generalized DiD regressions of restriction category (see Table 1) on the VC funding volume 
received. Categories range from 0 to 4, a higher restriction category implies more restrictive anti-tax loss traffick-
ing rules. Controls as indicated. Definition of variables: Table 11 (appendix). Differentiation depending on per-
centile in distribution of total VC funding volume of companies as indicated. *, **, and *** indicate significance 
at the 10, 5, and 1% level. Standard errors: Clustered at country level.  
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Table 19: Generalized DiD results, restriction category, age 
 0 to 5 years 5 to 10 years 10 to 15 years Above 15 years 
 log(VC funding) 
  I-4 I-4 I-4 I-4 
Restriction category -0.791* -0.030 -0.910*** -0.014 
Escape clause 0.829 0.531* -0.054 0.115 
LCF years -0.056* 0.040** 0.035*** 0.032 
LCB years 0.027 0.189*** 0.108** -0.120 
LCF limit 0.370 0.602*** 0.003 -0.071 
CIT -0.108* 0.042 -0.026 -0.049* 
CIT -0.019 -0.057** 0.005 0.006 
CGT -1.355 0.932 -1.378 -0.489 
DIT -0.329 0.255 1.526 1.160 
GDP per capita 0.000 0.000** 0.000 -0.000 
GDP growth -0.117 0.030 0.093*** 0.030 
Unemployment -0.147*** 0.065*** -0.051* -0.094** 
Inflation -0.037 -0.018 -0.153** -0.072 
EIF amount -0.001 0.000 -0.001*** -0.001** 
EIF number 0.000** -0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Lagged Public PE -0.000 0.000 -0.000** -0.000 
Lagged total assets -0.000** 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 
Age -0.252*** -0.261*** 0.014 -0.015 
LCF amount (1 yr) -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# Observations 4,541 7,100 5,027 3,391 
Adj. R-squared 0.009 0.014 0.009 0.000 
Notes: Results linear generalized DiD regressions of restriction category (see Table 1) on the logarithm of VC 
funding volume received. Categories range from 0 to 4, a higher restriction category implies more restrictive anti-
tax loss trafficking rules.  Controls as indicated. Definition of variables: Table 11 (appendix). Differentiation de-
pending on age of companies as indicated. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level. Standard 
errors: Clustered at country level.  
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Table 20: High-tech industries according to Eurostat 
NACE Code (Rev 2) Industry Classification 
21xx Pharmaceutical 
26xx ICT Manufacturing 
20xx Chemicals 
27xx – 30xx Electrical equipment, machinery, and equipment n.e.c… 
59xx – 63xx Video production, programming, information services… 
72xx Scientific R&D 
Notes: Industry sectors classified as “high-tech” based on the company’s four-digit NACE code. All industries not 
classified as “high-tech” are considered “low-tech”. 
 
Table 21: Generalized DiD results, restriction category, low- vs. high -tech  
 Low-tech companies High-tech companies 
 log(VC funding) 
  I-4 I-4 
Restriction category -0.272* -0.510*** 
Escape clause -0.020 0.149 
LCF years 0.018 -0.016 
LCB years 0.050 0.241*** 
LCF limit 0.342** 0.424** 
CIT -0.048 0.021 
CIT 0.027 -0.054** 
CGT -1.365** -1.371 
DIT 1.155 -2.065** 
GDP per capita 0.000 -0.000 
GDP growth 0.004 0.014 
Unemployment -0.030 -0.075*** 
Inflation -0.045 -0.116** 
EIF amount -0.000* 0.000 
EIF number 0.000** -0.000 
Lagged Public PE 0.000 -0.000 
Lagged total assets -0.000** -0.000 
Age -0.055*** -0.064*** 
LCF amount (1 yr) -0.000 0.000* 
Country FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
# Observations 9,358 7,895 
Adj. R-squared 0.008 0.014 
Notes: Results linear generalized DiD regressions of restriction category (see Table 1) on the logarithm of VC 
funding volume received. Categories range from 0 to 4, a higher restriction category implies more restrictive anti-
tax loss trafficking rules. Controls as indicated.  Definition of variables: Table 11 (appendix). Differentiation de-
pending on industry of companies as indicated. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level. 
Standard errors: Clustered at country level.  
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A2  VICO 4.0 Database, Construction of the Sample, and Potential Sample Selection Bias 
The European Commission’s RISIS initiative provides the VICO 4.0 database. The database 
has been used in several studies in the management and finance area for research questions 
investigating the VC industry (e.g., Bertoni, Croce, & Guerini, 2015; Croce, D’Adda, & 
Ughetto, 2015; Croce, Martí, & Murtinu, 2013; Grilli & Murtinu, 2014; Guerini & Quas, 2016). 
Table 22: Sample construction 







VICO 4.0 (Version: 16.05.2019) 68,698 24,238 49,682 - 
- Excluding all companies that ever had 
zero or missing VC funding reported 38,479 13,354 38,479 - 
- Append with zero VC funding for years 
without recorded VC funding 197,546 13,354 38,479 - 
- Combination with accounting data 216,647 24,238 38,479 37,695 
- Data cleaning: Dropping mismatches 
and duplicates, supplementing with 
hand-collected data 192,307 12,932 35,906 33,883 
- Manual validation of extreme outliers 191,763 12,901 35,821 33,721 
- Aggregation per company per year 140,534 11,665 14,650 25,269 
- Limitation to observations matched in 
the case studies 78,729 5,985 8,116 17,331 
- Limitation to observations with full 
coverage of control variables 
Company-level regression sample 17,331 3,163 1,753 17,331 
Notes: Procedure of sample construction. Report of resulting numbers of observations, differentiated by total num-
ber of observations, number of unique companies in the dataset, count of observations reporting non-zero VC 
funding, and number of observations with accounting data (total assets and profits and losses before taxes) avail-
able. 
It contains data on VC funding from Thompson One Private Equity (over 70%), Zephyr (around 
25%), and Crunchbase (less than 5%),35 covering companies founded since 1988 that were 
funded via VC or angel investment at least once since 1998 in the EU28 until 2015. Data is 
available on a company- (name, country, industry codes, age, balance sheet data), funding - 
                                                          
35 As Thomson One Private Equity and Crunchbase record VC funding in dollars, the equity raised has been con-
verted into thousand euros at exchange rates at the day of the funding. 
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(date, volume, number of rounds), and investor-level (name, country, type, industry codes, age). 
I winsorize VC funding at the 1 and 99 percent level. The last year shows a sudden decrease in 
observations, which is attributable to limitations in the data collection process (at the time of 
the data set's construction, not all information was readily available for the last year). Therefore, 
I drop 2015 from the sample.  
Some of the zero VC funding observations report a known or unknown but existing investor. 
Therefore, it is impossible to differentiate between “true” zero investment, where no funding 
took place, and investments with missing, but positive, funding volumes. I assume that the 
sample is complete in the sense that if I include a company, all funding rounds in the observation 
period are covered. This assumption does not require all VC funding events to be covered; it 
only demands the ones that I included to be complete. Therefore, I exclude all zero and missing 
company-year observations and all companies that ever had a zero or missing funding volume 
reported. Based on my assumption, I extend the data sample and add observations for years 
with no recorded VC investment with zeros inserted for VC funding.  
The accounting data that supplements the dataset originates from BvD’s Orbis database. First, 
I add Orbis data already provided within the VICO 4.0 framework, which covers the years 2005 
to 2014. For the other years, I add Orbis data supplied by the database available at the University 
of Mannheim, based on the BvD IDs included in the VICO 4.0 database. I do not find matches 
in the accounting data for the entire sample. As a result, the observations pre-2006 account for 
less than 2% of all observations.36 This discrepancy is caused by missing BvD IDs, the available 
BvD IDs not having an equivalent in the Orbis database, or, although the IDs match, simply no 
accounting information being available. Table 23 depicts the distribution of observations 
amongst countries and years in the final regression sample. 
The constraint to full accounting information introduces a bias in the sample: Often, small com-
panies are not required to publish financial statements and thus not covered in Orbis. The thresh-
olds for mandatory disclosure vary across countries in the size and type of measure (most com-
monly used are revenue, assets, or number of employees). I limit the constraint to the items 
with the best coverage within the sample: Profits and losses and total assets. Nevertheless, I 
tend to observe companies that are, compared to the total population of VC-backed companies, 
                                                          
36I repeat the name-matching between VICO 4.0 and Orbis for all companies that received funding before 2006. I 
am not able to extend the data. While a significant amount of the companies can be matched to an Orbis entry, 
the accounting coverage is severely lacking. However, excluding the period before 2006 does not greatly influ-
ence the estimates in chapter 5.3. The results for the analysis limited to 2006 – 2014 are not reported in this paper, 
but are available upon request from the author. 
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relatively large (albeit still small compared to the total population of firms in Orbis). The case 
studies rely on a matching approach that includes missing values and does not enforce this data 
restriction. However, the combined analysis has to be evaluated in light of the accounting data-
induced sample selection bias. 
Table 23: Distribution of observations per country & per year 
Country # Obs. Percentage   Year # Obs. Percent 
AT 89 0.51   1999 50 0.29 
BE 755 4.36   2000 57 0.33 
BG 6 0.03   2001 55 0.32 
CZ 99 0.57   2002 48 0.28 
DE 751 4.33   2003 46 0.27 
ES 2,594 14.97   2004 49 0.28 
FR 5,907 34.08   2005 42 0.24 
GB 5,293 30.54   2006 1,589 9.17 
GR 38 0.22   2007 1,746 10.07 
HR 57 0.33   2008 1,857 10.71 
HU 262 1.51   2009 1,933 11.15 
IT 717 4.14   2010 1,987 11.47 
LT 71 0.41   2011 1,995 11.51 
LV 74 0.43   2012 2,024 11.68 
NL 127 0.73   2013 2,002 11.55 
PL 190 1.1   2014 1,851 10.68 
PT 185 1.07      
RO 66 0.38     
SI 9 0.05     
SK 41 0.24     
Total 17,731 100   Total 17,331 100 
Notes: Geographic and temporal distribution of observations in the full sample (limited to observations with com-
plete information on aggregated VC funding per company year, country- and company-level control variables). 
Some of the smaller EU28 Member States included in the original VICO 4.0 data set are excluded due to missing 
supplementary data in the company-year observations concerned. The sudden increase in observations from 2005 
onwards results from incomplete coverage of accounting information in the data pre-2006.  
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A3  Calculation Example for Loss Carryforwards (4 years) 
Based on Bernasconi, Marenzi, and Pagani’s (2005) method, past losses (before taxes) are off-
set against subsequent profits. I only consider previous losses if there is no tax liability in t-1; 
otherwise, the value of the LCF in t is set to zero. This approach assumes that positive tax 
payments in t-1 indicate that all LCFs have been used, and no loss can be carried over from t-
1. As a result, I disregard restrictions regarding the maximum percentage or amount of LCFs 
that can be set off in a year (so-called minimum taxation). I set LCF (4 years) to missing in case 
the information on tax payments in t-1 is not available (see Table 24 for an example).  
Table 24: Calculation example LCF (4 years) 
 t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t 
P&L 100 200 -300 150  
Taxation 20 50 0 0  
LCF  0 0 -300 LCF (4 years)  = -150 
 
P&L 100 200 -300 150  
Taxation 20 50 0 50  
LCF  0 0 -300 LCF (4 years)  = 0 
 
P&L 100 -100 -300 150  
Taxation 20 50 0 .  
LCF  0 0 -300 LCF (4 years)  = . 
Notes: Three examples for the calculation of the four-year based LCF measure. Periods considered are four years 
previous to t. Past losses are netted against subsequent profits. The value of the LCF is set to zero in case of positive 
tax payment in t-1, and set to missing in case of missing tax payment in t-1. 
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A4 Additional Country Case Studies 
In the following sub-sections, I provide the results for the remaining country case studies that I 
do not include in the main analysis in section 4. From the full set of legislation changes available 
for analysis (see Table 12), the changes in the Netherlands and Portugal are missing. For these 
countries, it was not possible to construct control groups that satisfied the common trends as-
sumption. 
A4.1 Greece 
Greece introduced its first tax loss transfer restrictions in 2014. Loss carryforwards were denied 
after a change in ownership above one-third of the company’s shares. An exemption was made 
when the taxpayer could provide evidence that the change in the ownership structure had eco-
nomic reasons; in other words, that it was not purely tax-motivated. 
Figure 11: Results case study, Greece 
 
Notes: Event: Greece, introduction ownership-based regime in 2014. Dependent variable: Firm-level VC funding 
volume. Main graph: Results of the event study, difference between treatment and control group. Time dummies: 
“0”: time of change in legislation. “-t”: leads. “t”: lags. 95% confidence intervals. Grey box: Results of the panel 
analysis; standard error in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level. Sample 
composition: Table 25. Descriptive statistics: Table 26. Event study results: Table 27. Panel regression results: 
Table 28.  
As the sample ends in 2014, no post periods are available for the change in Greek legislation 
(Figure 11). The event study and the panel analysis indicate a negative effect, but the coefficient 
is statistically significant in neither case. Therefore, no clear conclusion can be drawn in this 
case based on the data available in this study. 
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A4.2 Croatia 
In 2010, Croatia introduced a cumulative regime. After a substantial change in ownership of 
more than 50%, loss carryforwards could be dismissed. This was the case if the company did 
not perform any business activity in the two years preceding the change in ownership or when 
the company’s business activity was changed significantly in the two years following the 
change in ownership. A rehabilitation exception applied. 
Figure 12: Results case study, Croatia 
 
Notes: Event: Croatia, introduction cumulative regime in 2010. Dependent variable: Firm-level VC funding vol-
ume. Main graph: Results of the event study, difference between treatment and control group. Time dummies: “0”: 
time of change in legislation. “-t”: leads. “t”: lags. 95% confidence intervals. Grey box: Results of the panel anal-
ysis; standard error in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level. Sample compo-
sition: Table 25. Descriptive statistics: Table 26. Event study results: Table 27. Panel regression results: Table 28.  
Figure 12 depicts the results for the change in legislation in Croatia.37 Neither the event study 
nor the panel analysis suggest any significant effects of the restrictions on VC funding. This is 
in line with expectations, as the type of regulation introduced in Croatia is far less restrictive 
than the regimes implemented in, e.g., the Czech Republic (Figure 4) or Germany (Figure 5). 
As long as start-ups retained their business activities, they did not risk losing accumulated loss 
carryforwards, irrespective of ownership changes. 
A4.3 Hungary 
Hungary already had an ownership-based regime in place until 2000. Loss carryforwards were 
denied if more than 50% of the shares changed ownership. The restrictions were abolished in 
2001 until a cumulative regime was introduced in 2012. The threshold was again set at 50%. 
                                                          
37 In the case of Croatia, only two pre-periods are available for the regression. The data on government-funded PE 
provided by InvestEurope does not include Croatia until 2007. Nevertheless, companies have been matched on 
the matching parameters in the three periods preceding the change in legislation. 
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Still, an activity clause now accompanied the ownership-criterion: The rules only applied if the 
company did not maintain its activity and generated revenues in the two years following the 
acquisition. There were no additional exemptions codified in tax law. 
Figure 13: Results case study, Hungary (2001) 
 
Notes: Event: Hungary, abolishment of ownership-based regime in 2001. Dependent variable: Firm-level VC fund-
ing volume. Main graph: Results of the event study, difference between treatment and control group. Time dum-
mies: “0”: time of change in legislation. “-t”: leads. “t”: lags. 95% confidence intervals. Grey box: Results of the 
panel analysis; standard error in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level. Sample 
composition: Table 25. Descriptive statistics: Table 26. Event study results: Table 27. Panel regression results: 
Table 28.  
Figure 14: Results case study, Hungary (2012) 
 
Notes: Event: Hugary, introduction cumulative regime in 2012. Dependent variable: Firm-level VC funding vol-
ume. Main graph: Results of the event study, difference between treatment and control group. Time dummies: “0”: 
time of change in legislation. “-t”: leads. “t”: lags. 95% confidence intervals. Grey box: Results of the panel anal-
ysis; standard error in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level. Sample compo-
sition: Table 25. Descriptive statistics: Table 26. Event study results: Table 27. Panel regression results: Table 28.  
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Figure 13 and Figure 14 depict the results for the change in legislation 200138 and 2012, respec-
tively. The sample spans 1999 to 2014. Consequently, for the abolishment of the ownership-
based regime 2001, only two pre-periods are available, and the cumulative regime's introduc-
tion in 2012 only two post-periods. For both event studies, the coefficients suggest a positive 
effect of the abolishment and a negative impact of introducing the restrictions, none are statis-
tically different. However, in line with my hypotheses the panel results indicate an increase in 
VC funding in reaction to the abolishment of the ownership-based restrictions.  
A4.4 Lithuania 
In 2002, the Lithuanian legislators introduced a cumulative anti-tax loss trafficking regime. 
Following an ownership change of more than two-thirds, loss carryforwards were forfeited if 
the corporation generated less than 85% of the income with the same activity that resulted in 
the losses. The tax law did not specify additional exemptions from the restriction.  
Figure 15: Results case study, Lithuania 
 
Notes: Event: Lithuania, introduction cumulative regime in 2002. Dependent variable: Firm-level VC funding 
volume. Main graph: Results of the event study, difference between treatment and control group. Time dummies: 
“0”: time of change in legislation. “-t”: leads. “t”: lags. 95% confidence intervals. Grey box: Results of the panel 
analysis; standard error in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level. Sample 
composition: Table 25. Descriptive statistics: Table 26. Event study results: Table 27. Panel regression results: 
Table 28.  
                                                          
38 In deviation from the regression equation stated in formula (1) and (2), in the case of Hungary (2001) govern-
ment-funded PE is not included as a control. The data provided by InvestEurope does not include Hungary un-
til 2007. However, the controls for funding programs from the EIF are available. 
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Figure 15 summarizes the estimates for the introduction of a cumulative regime in Lithuania.39 
As the sample starts in 1999, for the change in 2002, only three pre-periods are available. Sim-
ilarly to the introduction of cumulative restrictions in Croatia and Hungary, there is no indica-
tion of VC funding impairment due to the restrictions.  
  
                                                          
39In deviation from the regression equation stated in formula (1) and (2), in the case of Lithuania government-
funded PE is not included as a control. The data provided by InvestEurope does not include Lithuania until 
2007. However, the controls for funding programs from the EIF are available. 
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A4.5 Supplementary Tables (Additional Case Studies) 
Table 25: Sample composition, case studies (appendix) 
Country Number of observations Percentage 
Case study: Greece 
CZ 276 10.45 
ES 1,722 65.23 
GR 188 7.12 
PT 396 15 
SI 38 1.44 
SK 20 0.76 
Total 2,640 100 
Case study: Croatia 
BG 7 1.04 
CZ 109 16.22 
HR 83 12.35 
LT 50 7.44 
LV 55 8.18 
PL 291 43.3 
RO 69 10.27 
SK 8 1.19 
Total 672 100 
Case study: Hungary (2001) 
HR 118 7.97 
HU 474 32.03 
LV 64 4.32 
PL 601 40.61 
RO 141 9.53 
SI 48 3.24 
SK 34 2.3 
Total 1,480 100 
Case study: Hungary (2012) 
CZ 326 12.78 
HU 868 34.03 
LT 81 3.18 
LV 149 5.84 
PL 797 31.24 
RO 170 6.66 
SI 52 2.04 
SK 108 4.23 
Total 2,551 100 
Case study: Lithuania 
BG 16 2.73 
LT 80 13.65 
LV 48 8.19 
PL 288 49.15 
RO 120 20.48 
SK 34 5.8 
Total 586 100 
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Table 26: Descriptive statistics, case studies (appendix) 
Variable Obs Std. Dev. Min Mean Median Max 
Case Study: Greece 
Panel 1: Treatment group 
VC funding 188 884.87 0.00 158.67 0.00 10,193.35 
Total Assets 37 28.44 0.01 26.88 19.78 131.34 
LCF amount (1 yr) 37 0.47 -1.95 -0.23 0.00 0.00 
Age 182 5.67 0.00 7.87 7.00 24.00 
Panel 2: Control group 
VC funding 2452 2,285.68 0.00 309.59 0.00 61,000.00 
Total Assets 417 113.85 0.00 35.80 3.24 811.39 
LCF amount (1 yr) 418 6.22 -106.86 -0.85 0.00 0.00 
Age 2416 5.84 -1.00 7.73 7.00 24.00 
Case Study: Croatia 
Panel 1: Treatment group 
VC funding 83 1,192.69 0.00 211.24 0.00 10,000.00 
Total Assets 57 5.39 0.00 5.46 4.22 18.42 
LCF amount (1 yr) 57 0.68 -4.86 -0.15 0.00 0.00 
Age 83 7.17 0.00 12.66 15.00 24.00 
Panel 2: Control group 
VC funding 589 22,690.12 0.00 1,150.09 0.00 550,000.50 
Total Assets 145 1,017.14 0.03 175.45 2.14 7,636.00 
LCF amount (1 yr) 144 1.32 -14.98 -0.22 0.00 0.00 
Age 578 6.62 -1.00 10.04 10.00 51.00 
Case Study: Hungary (2001) 
Panel 1: Treatment group 
VC funding 474 1,933.31 0.00 205.30 0.00 34,007.89 
Total Assets 58 4.82 0.02 4.55 2.47 18.59 
LCF amount (1 yr) 58 0.53 -2.83 -0.14 0.00 0.00 
Age 474 5.44 0.00 9.68 9.50 25.00 
Panel 2: Control group 
VC funding 1006 1,467.05 0.00 274.18 0.00 27,067.64 
Total Assets 194 83.51 0.03 38.99 5.30 483.54 
LCF amount (1 yr) 194 0.91 -8.17 -0.18 0.00 0.00 
Age 1006 5.65 0.00 11.27 11.00 25.00 
Case Study: Hungary (2012) 
Panel 1: Treatment group 
VC funding 844 1,482.59 0.00 182.18 0.00 34,007.89 
Total Assets 208 3.47 0.00 2.42 1.15 18.59 
LCF amount (1 yr) 203 0.31 -2.83 -0.06 0.00 0.00 





Variable Obs Std. Dev. Min Mean Median Max 
Panel 2: Control group 
VC funding 1475 14,450.22 0.00 628.65 0.00 550,000.50 
Total Assets 295 883.49 0.00 147.32 1.76 7,636.00 
LCF amount (1 yr) 294 17.48 -299.00 -1.32 0.00 0.00 
Age 1431 6.23 -1.00 8.16 7.00 51.00 
Case Study: Lithuania 
Panel 1: Treatment group 
VC funding 80 1,207.40 0.00 211.37 0.00 9,552.92 
Total Assets 27 22.03 0.46 14.20 2.26 77.86 
LCF amount (1 yr) 27 0.32 -1.63 -0.10 0.00 0.00 
Age 80 4.92 4.00 13.90 14.00 23.00 
Panel 2: Control group 
VC funding 506 1,868.92 0.00 357.28 0.00 27,067.64 
Total Assets 59 34.51 0.21 23.69 5.27 108.46 
LCF amount (1 yr) 59 1.11 -8.17 -0.23 0.00 0.00 
Age 506 5.16 0.00 10.40 10.00 23.00 
Notes: Summary statistics for the variables, as defined in Table 11. Differentiated between case study and treat-
ment (Panel 1) and control group (Panel 2). 
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Table 27: Results event study, case studies (appendix) 
 Event study 
 log(VC funding) 
  GR HR HU (2001) HU (2012) LT 
t-4 1.753 - - -0.148 - 
t-3 0.270 - - 0.049 -1.533* 
t-2 -0.933 -0.002 0.806 0.635 0.398 
t -0.448 0.383 0.914 -0.098 0.064 
t+1 - -0.318 0.758 -0.161 0.664 
t+2 - 2.049 0.461 -0.179 0.300 
t+3 - -0.725 0.345 - -1.904 
t+4 - 0.741 0.627 - -1.180 
Escape clause omitted omitted 0.025 omitted omitted 
LCF years 0.037 0.075 -0.004 0.024 0.102* 
LCB years omitted omitted omitted omitted omitted 
LCF limit -0.558 1.928** 0.290 -1.009 -1.584* 
CIT -0.192** -0.227* 0.095* 0.004 0.196 
CIT 0.190** 0.218*** -0.075* -0.067 -0.160* 
CGT 3.224 -5.824 2.248* -1.287 1.818 
DIT -3.210*** -4.613 -1.296 -3.381 -3.354 
GDP per capita -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
GDP growth 0.003 0.044 -0.007 0.007 0.007 
Unemployment -0.035 0.139** -0.035 -0.036 -0.019 
Inflation 0.133 -0.100* 0.025 -0.076*** -0.006 
EIF amount -0.002** 0.017*** -0.010** -0.010** -0.002 
EIF number -0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Lagged Public PE 0.000* -0.000 - 0.000 - 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# Observations 2,640 672 1,480 2,319 586 
Adj. R-squared 0.054 0.070 0.093 0.063 0.068 
Notes: Dependent variable: Firm-level VC funding volume. Results of the event study, difference between treat-
ment and control group. “t”: time of change in legislation. “t-x”: leads. “t+x”: lags. Controls as indicated. Defini-
tion of variables: Table 11. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level. Standard errors: Clus-
tered at country level. “Omitted”: Variable was omitted from the regression due to multi-collinearity.  
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Table 28: DiD results, restriction category, case studies (appendix) 
 I - Restriction category 
 log(VC funding) 
  GR HR HU (2001) HU (2012) LT 
Restriction category -0.716 0.304 0.522** -0.253 0.055 
Escape clause omitted -0.349 0.017 0.020 omitted 
LCF years 0.030 0.049 -0.013 0.022 0.073 
LCB years omitted omitted omitted omitted omitted 
LCF limit -0.266 1.886** 0.276 -1.084*** -1.526 
CIT -0.156 -0.237*** 0.079 0.015 0.157 
CIT 0.170 0.206*** -0.071 -0.078 -0.143** 
CGT 3.797 -5.973*** 2.167* -2.021 1.749 
DIT -3.639** 0.520 -1.497 -2.590 -1.888 
GDP per capita -0.000** 0.000** 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
GDP growth 0.033 0.025 0.003 0.016 0.019 
Unemployment -0.037 0.123* -0.012 -0.025 -0.014 
Inflation 0.174 -0.098** 0.028 -0.072** -0.004 
EIF amount -0.002*** 0.016** -0.010** -0.010* -0.004 
EIF number -0.000 -0.001*** 0.000** 0.000 0.000 
Lagged Public PE 0.000** -0.000 - 0.000 - 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# Observations 2,640 672 1,480 2,319 586 
Adj. R-squared 0.054 0.070 0.095 0.063 0.069 
Notes: Results linear DiD regressions of treatment dummy on the logarithm of VC funding volume received. 
Treatment dummy equals 1 in the year of change in legislation and all following years, and zero otherwise. Con-
trols as indicated. Definition of variables: Table 11 (appendix). *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, 
and 1% level. Standard errors: Clustered at country level. “Omitted”: Variable was omitted from the regression 
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